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POST-RACIAL LENDING? 
Cassandra Jones Havard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Should lenders have absolute discretion when setting mortgage loan prices 
regardless of the borrower's creditworthiness? How should a regulatory 
framework evaluate lending decisions for racial bias to determine if 
demographic or other variables are used as proxies for race? Congress enacted 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in order to acquire data on mortgage 
lending patterns and to discourage geographical disinvestment. I Basic HMDA 
data indicates that mortgage loan applications from black and Hispanic 
households are more likely to be denied than are applications from whites. 
Loan denial rates for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are higher than white 
applicants at all income levels? The data also indicates that even after 
controlling for credit characteristics, minority homeowners are concentrated in 
the sub-prime sector. 3 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful for the research 
assistanee of Mark Anthony Lancaster, '13 and Edith Agbanyim, '15 and the financial support of 
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I. ALLEN FISHBEIN & REN ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR HouS. STUDIES OF HARYARD UNIY., 
THE HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT AT THIRTY-FIYE: PAST HISTORY, CURRENT ISSUES I 
(2010) ("The impetus for HMDA grew out of growing public concerns in the 1970s about 
mortgage "redlining" and the effects of disinvestment on the nation's older urban 
neighborhoods."); Cf U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-704, FAIR LENDING: 
DATA LiMITATIONS AND THE FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
CHALLENGE FEDERAL OYERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (luI. 15, 2009) [hereinafter 
U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE] (identifying the limitations ofHMDA data and discussing 
how those limitations and the fragmented financial regulatory system contribute to the 
ineffectiveness of fair lending enforcement). 
2. STEPHEN ROSS & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 6 fig. 1.2 (2002). 
3. DEBBIE G. BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE 
EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 17 tbl. 6, 18 tbl. 7 
(2006) (using controls and the 2004 HMDA data and credit scores controlling for mortgage 
product type, credit score, loan-to-value, and other variables, blacks were 6.1 percent to 34.3 
percent more likely than whites to receive a higher rate subprime mortgage, and Latinos were 
28.6 pereent to 37.4 percent more likely to receive a higher rate mortgage). 
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Countrywide Financial Corporation was known for its aggressive growth 
strategy and was at its height the largest U.S. mortgage lender. In 2007 alone, 
it originated $408 billion in loans.4 When it was ultimatel~ acquired by Bank 
of America in 2009, it still managed 400,000 home loans. Lax underwriting 
standards and discriminatory lending fueled this growth of loans.6 Countywide 
made loans based on false or missing data about both borrowers and 
properties.? Furthermore, a Department of Justice investigation found that 
during the housing boom, Countrywide engaged in a pattern and practice of 
discrimination.8 During the years 2004-2008, it discriminated against African-
American and Hispanic borrowers by charging higher fees and rates to more 
than 200,000 minority borrowers across the country.9 These borrowers posed 
the same credit risk as white borrowers with similar profiles. 10 By 
systematically charging higher discretionary fees and markups to minority 
borrowers, Countrywide ll steered more than 10,000 minority borrowers into 
costly sub prime mortgages when they were eligible for less expensive loan 
products. I Countrywide specifically targeted minority borrowers to sell them 
costly and defective loans that quickly went into foreclosure. 13 
Until recently, the regulatory scheme fully sanctioned Countrywide's 
practices and policies because it gave lenders the discretion to offer borrowers 
loan products without regard to costs, fees, the borrower's ability to repay, or 
the suitability of the particular product for the borrower. 14 Additionally, 
4. Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Mortgage Crisis and Mortgage-Backed Securities, in 32 
SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 1, 1 (2010). 
5. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 
13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 91 (2009). 
6. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, How COUNTRYWIDE'S 
IRRESPONSIBLE PRACTICES HAVE HARMED SHAREHOLDERS AND BORROWERS 3-4 (2008). 
7. Bank of Am. Corp. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 4th 862, 865, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 
506 (2011). 
8. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Reaches 
$335 Million Settlement to Resolvc Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide 
Financial Corporation (Dcc. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-reachcs-335-million-settlement-resolve-allcgations-lending-discrimination. 
9. Countrywide Financial Pays $335 Million to End Bias Case, ANDREWS FIN. CRISIS 
LITIG. REP. (Jan. 10,2012), available at 2012 WL 72288. 
10. Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer Fraud & 
Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL'y 121, 151 (2009). 
11. John L. Ropiequet, Assessing the Impact of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes on Fair 
Lending Litigation, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L., 195,218 (2012). 
12. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions - Ten Years Later, 64 
S.C. L. REv. 1,23 (2012). 
13. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Recent Fair Lending Cases (Dec. 28, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
14. Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgagc-standards-undcr-thc-truth-in-Iending-act-regu 
lation-z/ (explaining that on January 10,2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued 
rules requiring creditors to make a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer's ability to 
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borrowers are often unaware of which underwriting criteria lenders use, how 
brokers price loans, or the amount of their compensation. IS The regulatory 
scheme operates in a lending climate ripe with unequal bargaining power that 
favors the lender and results in a post-hoc determination, at best, by regulators 
that the lender treated the borrower unfairly. Even with the recent changes, 
risk-based pricing involves unchecked lender discretion. Failing to monitor 
lender decision-making sanctions the vague regulatory standard as well as the 
stated law. 16 
The established rule is that lenders may not discriminate based on race. I? 
Minority borrowers thus can presume that the nation's fair lending laws protect 
them from lending discrimination. Yet, racial disparities in lending remain. 18 
These disparities are magnified in the risk-based pricing segment of mortgage 
lending. During the height of sub prime crisis, minorities received almost forty 
percent of the higher-priced loans. 19 As discussed below, what is unclear in 
repay any consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling (excluding an open-end credit plan, 
timeshare plan, rcverse mortgage, or temporary loan) and established ccrtain protections from 
liability under this requirement for "qualified mortgages."). 
15. Cassandra Jones Havard, "Gain' Round in Circles" ... and Letting the Bad Loans Win: 
When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Needfor Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. 
REv. 738,742,786 (2008). 
16. See discussion infra Part IV. 
17. Since 1968, lenders have been subject to a panoply of fair lending laws. The fair lending 
statutes are comprised of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 90-
284, Title VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1988 & 
Supp. VI 1994); Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 2901-07 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994); 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 2801-10 (1988 & Supp. VI 1994); Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(t) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994). 
18. Brad Stone, Banks Mine Data and Woo Troubled Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008 
(critiquing marketing techniques targeting minority homeowners). 
19. Because it does not include underwriting and pricing factors the HMDA data alone 
cannot indicate whether racial and ethnic pricing disparities reflect illegal discrimination. 
However, a 2008 Federal Reserve study used HMDA data to determine the percentage of 
subprime loans made by lenders. The incidence of higher-priced lending for minorities was 38.1 
percent in 2007 and 14.2 percent in 2008, with the decline paralleling the collapse of the 
subprimc market. Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Beveroot, Glenn 8. Canncr & 
Christa N. Gibbs, The 2008 HMDA Data: The Mortgage Market During a Turbulent Year, FED. 
RES. BULL. A169, AI89 (2010). In 1998, the subprime market was still a recent financial 
phenomenon, which gained a significant market share about five years earlier. HUD release a 
study of the subprime market that showed that subprime loans were three times more likely to be 
made in African American neighborhoods than in White neighborhoods. Additionally, 
homeowners in high-income African-American neighborhoods were twice as likely to receive 
subprime loans as residents in low-income White neighborhoods. Subprime loans accounted for 
26 percent of total loans in 1998-compared with only II percent in moderate-income 
neighborhoods and just 7 percent in upper-income neighborhoods. DEP'T. OF Hous. AND URBAN 
DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 
2 (1998); see also Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where and to Whom, 
FIN. AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 3 (2008-09) (concluding that "subprime loans are more 
concentrated in locations where credit is difficult to obtain"); but see Andrew Haughwout, 
Christopher Mayer & Joseph Tracy, Subprime Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, 
and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS no. 368, 22 
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risk-based pricing in general, and in mortgage lending specifically, is what 
warehouse lenders should do to comply with the anti-discrimination rules. 
Mortgage lending discrimination is a persistent problem in minority 
communities.2o The sub-prime lending crisis appears to be yet another 
manifestation of that problem because sub prime and predatory lending tactics 
put many minority families in jeopardy of default and foreclosure. 21 The cause 
of this particular crisis is open to debate. Explanations include materialistic 
borrowers who choose to purchase more house than they can afford, lax 
underwriting by ori§:inators, inaccurate appraisals, and fraudulent practices by 
investment bankers. 2 
Most would agree in retrospect that the subprime financial crisis was an 
exemplar of market failure?3 The lack of competition for mortgage credit in 
low and moderate income market segments provided an advantage to those 
lenders willing to lend?4 Banks that formerly redlined neighborhoods 
provided access to mortgage credit that was unaffordable and destabilizing.25 
(2009) ("Subprime lending [served] as a positive supply shock for credit in locations with high 
unemployment rates and minority residents."). 
20. Wiley E. Rice, Consumers, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 584-99 (discussing the 
persistent problem of racial discrimination in home mortgage and insurance markets and positing 
that courts arc ineffective in resolving the issues) (1996). See e.g., LORRAINE HANSBERRY, A 
RAISIN IN THE SUN: A DRAMA IN THREE ACTS (1959) (demonstrating that barriers to obtaining a 
mortgage arc legendary within communities of color and underlie the cultural distrust of 
traditional banks. A Raisin in the Sun is a classic play that puts a literary take on some of the 
issues minorities face in acquiring home ownership based on the use of restrictive covenants). 
21. RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH 
GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS 10, 19, 22 (2011) 
[hereinafter WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS]' 
22. Howard Husock, The Financial Crisis and the CRA, CITY J., Oct. 30,2008, available at 
http://www.city-joumal.org/2008/eonI030hh.html(discussing how HUD's mandated "affordable 
housing goals" introduced credit risk into the secondary market). 
23. Diego Valiante, The Market for Subprime Lending: A Law and Economics Analysis of 
Market Failures and Policy Responses 4 (Ph.D. Thesis, LUISS University (Rome) and Centre for 
European Policy Studies (Brussels), Working Paper No. I, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=1956463, (describing the subprime mortgage crisis as a mix of "irrational and 
opportunistic behaviours, as well as a lack of regulation, supervision and in-efficient [sic] 
disclosure. "). 
24. Monopoly power is harmful to competition and to consumers. Companies that achieve 
monopoly power arc able to charge supra-competitive prices because they control the market. 
See Dustin Sharpes, Reintroducing Intent into Predatory Pricing Law, 61 EMORY LJ. 903, 906 
(2012) (discussing how monopoly power is harmful). Although the subprime market was not 
monopolized by anyone lender, minority borrowers and neighborhoods felt the monopolistic 
effect of anti-competitivc pricing. 
25. John P. Segal a, Redlining: An Economic Analysis, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND 
ECON. REV. 3 (1980) (defining redlining as " ... whcn lendcrs base any c1cment of the 
mortgage decision, including whether or not to lend and the terms of the lOan, on the 
geographic location of the property or on the characteristics of surrounding properties."; Ira 
Goldstein & Dan Urevick-Ackelsberg, Subprime Lending, Mortgage Foreclosures And Race: 
How Far Have We Come And How Far Have We To Go? THE REINVESTMENT FUND, 6 (2008) 
(discussing how minorities are targeted at a higher rate for subprime loans and the high incidence 
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In effect, subprime lenders were able to control prices in the market because it 
. .. 26 
was anti-competitive. 
Although fair lending scholars continue to debate the value of the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), the broad consensus prevails that requiring 
lenders to report demographic characteristics and loan product information 
regarding home mortgage loans enhances the enforcement of lending 
discrimination laws.27 Yet, the current regulatory regime contributes to the 
mortgage market's anti-competiveness, which results in inefficiency.28 The 
risk-based price market is inefficient because it does not appropriately price 
risk for all borrowers. HMDA data is critical to regulatory efforts to monitor a 
lending institution's compliance with fair lending laws, which prohibit 
discrimination in residential real-estate related lending on the basis of specific 
factors, including race?9 HMDA laws and regulations require most lenders to 
of failure among subprime loans). 
26. See Kristin L. Perkins. The Geography of Foreclosure in Contra Costa County, 
California, 3 (N.Y.C. Dep't of Hous. Pres. and Dev., Working Paper 2009-03, 2009) (noting that 
subprime loans were concentrated in neighborhoods with high proportions of minority residents, 
lower-income households, and less educated households). 
27. See George J. Benston, Mortgage Redlining Research: A Review and Critical Analysis, 
in THE REG. OF FIN. INSTS. 144, 162 (1979), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/ 
economic/conf/conf2l/eonf2lf.pdf("1t seems clear that the studies of the supply of mortgages to 
specific areas and groups by subsets of lenders arc of very little value."); James R. Barth, Joseph 
J. Cordes & Anthony M. Yezer, Financial Institution Regulations, Redlining and Mortgage 
Markets, in THE REG. OF FIN. INSTS. 101, 102. (1979), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/ 
eeonomic/conf/conf2I1conf2le.pdf (stating the HMDA and the Community Reinvestment Act 
restrict the ability of firms to make economically efficient lending decision); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 
291,313,319-24 (1993) (arguing that the Community Reinvestment Act, HMDA's companion 
statute, reduces bank safety and soundness). Proponents of HMDA data argue that by collecting 
the data and examining tends in the housing finance market, the regulatory process is 
strengthened in terms of detecting discrimination. See George C. Galster, Research on 
Discrimination in Housing and Mortgage Markets: Assessment and Future Directions, 3 
HOUSING POL'y DEBATE, 639-83 (1992), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.orglkp/ 
text_ document_summary/scholarly _article/relfiles/hpd _ 0302 _galster.pdf; Ronald E. Wienk, 
Discrimination in Urban Credit Markets: What We Don't Know and Why We Don't Know It, 3 
HOUSING POL'y DEBATE, 217-40 (1992), available at http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/img/ 
eache/sem/39569.pdf (suggesting that more research is needed on where in the lending process 
discrimination occurs in the housing market); see also Adam Rust, A Principle-Based Redesign of 
HMDA and CRA Data, 4 COMMUNITY DEV. INVESTMENT REv. 178, 178 (2009), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/community-developmentlfiles/principlebased_redesign_hdma_cra_data.pdf 
(stating that HMDA databases did not keep pace with financial innovations and require reform); 
Mac A. Cavoli, Fair Lending Laws: The Growing Tension, 115 BANKING L. J. 604, 608 (1998), 
available at http://heinonline.org/HOLIPage?handle=hein.journalslblj 115&div=55&g_sent=1 & 
collection=journals. 
28. See discussion supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text for how the current regulatory 
scheme contributes to the mortgage market's inefficiency. 
29. The fair lending laws, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 and 
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631, prohibit discrimination in all phases of 
residential real estate lending. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) gave authority under ECOA to the CFPB and, with respect to 
2014] HAVARD: POST-RACIAL LENDING? 181 
collect and report demographic information about their borrowers so that they 
and their regulators can analyze among other things how mortgage loans are 
priced, for potentially discriminatory patterns.30 Lender's pricing of residential 
mortgages has become discriminatory because lenders used different standards 
in determining whether to extend credit or varied the terms of credit offered, 
including the amount, interest rate, duration, and type of loan.3l 
The warehouse line of credit is integral to the existing mortgage lending 
cycle because it provides short-term funding from the closing table to sale on 
the secondary market. Warehouse lenders make lines of credit available to a 
multiplicity of third-party originators, banks, correspondent lenders and 
brokers. These third-party originators in tum work directly with mortgage 
borrowers?2 Discriminatory pricing disparities may occur because of the mix 
of these third-party originators or because the individual third parties negotiate 
different prices for the same products to different borrowers. As a result, a 
loan product that theoretically complies with the fair lending regulations may 
entItIes within its jurisdiction, granted authority to the CFPB to supervise for and enforce 
compliance with ECOA and its implemcnting regulations. 
30. The CFPB announced proposed changes to HMDA in July 2014. The addition data 
includes property value, tcrm of the loan, total points and fees as well as additional information 
on underwriting such as pricing such as debt-to-income ratios, interest ratios and total discount 
points. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, HMDA PROPOSAL, HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE, 
REGULATION C (2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fI201407_cfpbyroposed-
rule _ home-mortgage-disclosure _regulation-c.pdfes. 
31. See discussion in text infra surrounding footnote 122. 
32. Warehouse lending provides short-term loans to fund mortgages that mortgage brokers 
and banks originate. The warehouse loan is similar to a line of credit loan and is paid off when the 
loan is sold to a permanent investor, such as the secondary market. See Barry Epstein, Mortgage 
Warehouse Lending is Safer Than Many Bankers Think, AM. BANKER (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.americanbanker.comlbankthinklmortgage-warehouse-financing-asset-based-Iending-
1048891-l.html (discussing that warehouse lending provides short-term loans to fund mortgages 
that mortgage brokers and banks originate). 
Title XIV of Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB authority to issue regulations restricting transactions 
involving mortgage brokers and imposing certain requirements and limitations on compensation 
and activities. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 1001-1100, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010). In an effort to avoid these 
restrictions, mortgage brokers arc converting to mini-correspondents. By setting up arrangements 
with wholesale lenders, the mortgage brokers will purport to act as mini-correspondent lenders. 
The mortgage broker appears to be the lender or creditor engaging in activities that lenders or 
creditors commonly engage in such as closing the loan in its own name, funding the loan from a 
warehouse line of credit, and receiving premium compensation for the sale of the loan to an 
investor. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Guidance Regarding Brokers 
Shifting To "Mini-Correspondent" Model, Jul II 2014, available at http://www.consumer 
finanee.gov/newsroom/eonsumer-financial-protection-bureau-issues-guidance-regarding-brokers-
shifting-to-mini-eorrespondent-model. The CFPB issued a non-binding policy guidance to guide 
mortgage brokers making the transition. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., 481O-AM-P, 
POLlCY GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY AND ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO 
MORTGAGE BROKERS TRANSITIONING TO MINI-CORRESPONDENT LENDERS 4-5, 13-14 (2014), 
available at http://files.consumerfinanee.gov/f/201407_cfpb_guidance _ mini-correspondent-Iend 
ers.pdf. 
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result in an unwarranted higher cost at the borrower level for the underlying 
mortgage origination.33 Unchecked, this type of lending fosters the market's 
inefficiency because it allows warehouse lenders, indirectly, to make loans that 
are not priced similarly to other loans with the same level of risk. 
Counteracting this unchecked inefficiency and making HMDA more effective 
in detecting potential discrimination requires loan-pricing information from the 
warehouse lenders that fund mortgage originations through third parties. 
The overall inquiry is whether lenders can show that the borrower's actual 
risk correlates with the interest rates and fees charged.34 The industry 
challenge, and regulatory concern, is how to create competitive pressures in the 
mortgage markets that will increase efficiency and ensure that prices for 
d· . h . k 35 mortgage cre It are commensurate WIt ns . 
This Article intends to resolve whether HMDA's reporting requirements 
are fair and efficient in policing discriminatory lending. It focuses on risk-
based pricing,36 which is a practice that services many minority borrowers and 
expands their access to credit. Part II of this Article explains how HMDA's 
reporting requirements are a legislative response to excessive lender discretion. 
It calls into question the efficacy of HMDA reporting as a meaningful 
constraint on lenders' decision-making and raises the question of whether 
lenders, by using statistical discrimination, may be using race in screening and 
loan pricing under the guise of risk assessment.3? 
Part III is the centerpiece of the Article. It addresses the question of what 
constraint, if any, HMDA places on the capacity of lenders to comply with fair 
lending laws when making risk-based loans. It argues that given the changed 
nature of the home mortgage market, the current fair lending tests are 
33. One study found that subprime lending occurred more with non-White Hispanic 
borrowers and upper income borrowers and argues that housing policy reforms should represent a 
perspectivc beyond race. See Maurice Jourdain-Earl, The Demographic Impact of the Subprime 
Meltdown, COMPLIANCE TECH., available at http://www.compliancetech.com/files/Demographic 
%20Impact%200f%20the%20Subprimc%20Mortgagc%20Meltdown.pdf (discussing a study that 
found that subprime Icnding occurrcd more with non-White Hispanic borrowers and upper 
income borrowers, and argues that housing policy reforms should represent a perspective beyond 
race). 
34. See discussion infra Part IV. 
35. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note I (The cal1 is for more 
synergistic integration of economic policy and legal rules. At the request of Financial Services 
Committee Chairman Barney Frank, (D-MA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
conducted a "comprehensive review" of the current state of federal fair lending enforcement. The 
report, released in July 2009, found that data enhancement is needed to detect potential fair 
lending violations. It also suggested an overhaul of the financial regulatory structure to ensure 
"consistcnt and effective federal oversight" of fair lending laws). 
36. Risk-based pricing al10ws lenders to assess the crcdit risk of borrowers and offcr 
variability in pricing. Lenders charge a higher interest rate based on the estimated risk that the 
borrowers would not repay the loan. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of 
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 126-27 (2007). 
37. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
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ineffective in assessing the disparate impact of lenders' discretion. 
Specifically, it reviews the case law surrounding the recent decisions in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortgage and concludes 
that these rulings unnecessarily hinder a successful disparate impact claim 
based on discretionary pricing. The section ends with a critique of courts' 
evaluations of the business justification defense as a part of the disparate 
impact analysis and argues for a more scrutinizing evaluation of a lender's 
proffered claim of business necessity. It concludes that disparate impact 
should be viewed as a discretion-constraining rule.38 
This Article posits that Congress' response to lending discrimination is 
inadequate. Congress presents Title VII's fair lending rules as effective 
against discriminatory lending practices and policies. However, Congress fails 
to appreciate that the present fair lending legal regime is inherently ineffective 
when applied to risk-based pricing's broadly discretionary method of decision-
making. Lenders circumvented the existing legal constraints on discriminatory 
lending by making a higher incidence of risk-based loans to minorities 
regardless of creditworthiness. Regulators failed to develop an adequate 
compliance mechanism to detect this type of discriminatory lending. 
Warehouse lenders, or lenders who provide short-term financing to mortgage 
originators such as banks, correspondent lenders, and brokers, represent an 
unchecked link in the lending process. While these lenders may not be 
intentionally discriminating, they are not monitoring their "borrowers" for non-
discrimination. Requiring warehouse lenders to monitor loan origination is an 
effective way of ferreting out whether there is a disparate impact in lending. 
Thus, Part IV argues that regulatory reform will serve as a check on originating 
lenders' discretion, a check for which HMDA presently serves an important 
though insufficient role.39 Specifically, HMDA should place a more exacting 
duty on warehouse lenders to engage in on-going validation and monitoring of 
origination loan funds for non-discriminatory lending. This simple, but 
profound change will constrain the originating lender's discretion by limiting 
the ability to choose a loan product that is not competitive, affordable, 
sustainable, or correlated to borrower risk. This will also affect the loan 
originator's ability to improperly use the business judgment justification as a 
defense, thereby tailoring that doctrine to the actual lending process. 
II. THE DUBIOUS VALUE OF HMDA 
HMDA is a loan reporting statute.40 From its inception, HMDA's ultimate 
goal was to further fairness and efficiency in the mortgage market and to 
38. See discussion infra Part III. 
39. Originating lender is used here to describe a party that originates the loan, whether it is 
a mortgage broker, bank, or the mini-correspondents under the new Dodd-Frank rules. 
40. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO HMDA REPORTING: GETTING 
IT RIGHT! I, 1 (2013), available at http://www.ffiee.gov/hmda/pdf/2013guidc.pdf. 
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encourage community investment.41 It requires lenders to provide annual data 
on the applications they receive and the loans they make. To ultimately 
achieve its goal, however, HMDA's reporting requirements require ongoing 
scrutiny as markets expand, loan products develop, and new ways of assessing 
credit become available. 
A. HMDA as a Market Corrector 
HMDA data provides public information about lending patterns. 
Historically, it is best known as an anti-redlining measure.42 HMDA data was 
integral to the identification of areas of communities where housing-credit 
needs were unmet and neighborhood disinvestment occurred.43 Presently, 
HMDA enhances the enforcement of fair lending by identifying market 
disparities in credit availability and loan terms.44 HMDA data exposed the 
market segmentation that reflected minorities having a greater incidence of 
higher-priced loans.45 In this regard, HMDA prompts regulators to undertake a 
more careful examination of lenders' fair lending practices and encourages 
lenders to evaluate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with anti-
discrimination statutes. 
1. Legislating Reporting Requirements 
Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975 to prevent 
lending discrimination.46 By legislating reporting requirements, HMDA 
requires certain banks and other mortgage lending institutions to report 
information about mortgage applications, applicants, and the lender's decision 
on the application.47 HMDA data is compiled annually and made available to 
41. Mark W. Olson, Governor, Remarks before Consumer Bankers Association 2005 Fair 
Lending Conference, Arlington, Va., A Look At Fair Lending Through The Lens Of The New 
HMDA Data, (Nov. 7, 2005) available at 2014 WL 1221358, (discussing the inherent limitations 
of HMDA's data in promoting market efficiency and legal compliance). 
42. Richard D. Marsico, Looking Back and Looking Ahead As the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act Turns Thirty-Five: The Role of Public Disclosure of Lending Data in A Time of 
Financial Crisis, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 205, 206-08 (2009) (discussing HMDA's history 
and arguing that the subprime mortgage crisis is indicative of the need for HMDA reform). 
43. Scnator William Proxmire, one of the bill's sponsors, described HMDA as a "very 
gentle remedy." Id. at 213. 
44. Fair Lending and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Hearing before Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations, H. Comm. on Fin. Scrvs. I 10th Con gr. (July 25, 2007) (testimony 
of Mark S. Olson, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd.), available at http://www.fcderalrescrve. 
gov/ncwsevents/testimony/olson20060613a.htm. 
45. Gregory D. Squires, Derek S. Hyra & Robert N. Renner. Segregation and the Subprime 
Lending Crisis 3 (Eeon. Pol. Inst., Briefing Paper #244, 2009), available at http://www.epi. 
org/files/page/-/pdf/ 11 0409-bricfingpaper244.pdf. 
46. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1975). The CFPB implements HMDA through Regulation C. 
47. HMDA requires lenders to report the amount and type of loan, the location of property, 
the race, sex and income of the applicant, and whether the application was approved or denied. 
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, HISTORY OF HMDA, available at http://www.ffiec. 
govlhmdalhistory2.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
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the public.48 The Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve) is the regulatory 
agency that was initially responsible for implementing HMDA by writing the 
. l' 49 governmg regu atJons. 
Congress' objectives when enacting HMDA were at least two-fold. First, 
Congress intended the HMDA data to assist in determining whether financial 
institutions were successfully meeting their communities' housing credit 
needs. 50 Second, the data disclosure was designed to attract lender investment 
to areas in need of community development. 51 
At its inception, HMDA required no more than simple statistical 
reporting. 52 Lenders were required to report the total number of loans made to 
individuals for home purchases, refinances, and improvements, as well as the 
final decision on the application. When Congress passed the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA)53 two years later, HMDA's reporting requirements 
were viewed as complementary and were intended to deter redlining by 
identifying potentially discriminatory lending patterns. 54 
48. Depository lending institutions, e.g., banks, credit unions, and savings associations, arc 
required to file under HMDA if they mandated the annual reporting of information, by mortgage 
lending institutions with at least $10 million in assets, on the number and dollar amount of both 
home mortgage and home improvement loans, by census tract or county. Jd. Under the CFPB's 
proposed rules, non-depository mortgage lenders may be required to report only if they make at 
least 100 loans in a year, with an exception around reverse mortgages. See CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, HMDA PROPOSAL - HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE, REGULATION C (2014), 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f1201407_cfpb yroposed-rule _ home-mortgage-disc 
10sureJegulation-c.pdf. 
49. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank) transferred HMDA rulemaking authority from the Federal Reserve Board (Federal 
Reserve) to the CFPB. Dodd-Frank also changed HMDA supervisory and enforcement authority 
to the CFPB from the various banking regulatory agencies, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (FRS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). On Aug. 29, 2014, 
CFPB issued a proposed rule that added several new reporting requirements and clarified existing 
ones. The proposed rule does not address warehouse lenders. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
HMDA PROPOSAL, HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE, REGULATION C (2014), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb yroposed-rule _ home-mortgage-
disclosure _regulation-c.pdf. 
50. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., COMPLIANCE MANUAL § V-9.1 (2014), available at 
http://www . fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdfN -9 .1. pdf. 
51. KATHRYN PETTIT & AUDREY DROESCH, URBAN INST., A GUIDE TO HOME MORTGAGE 
DISCLOSURE ACT DATA 5 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001247_ 
hdma.pdf. 
52. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Ongoing Experiment with "Regulation from Below": 
Expanded Reporting Requirementsfor HMDA and CRA, 3 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 601, 601-36 
(1992). 
53. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (codified as 
amcnded at 12 U.S.c. §§ 2901-09 (2006)). 
54. See Cassandra J. Havard, Synergy and Friction-The CRA, BHCs, SBA and Community 
Development Lending, 86 Ky. LJ. 617, 618-19 (1998). 
186 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y [Vol. XXIV:l 
Regulation C, which is the regulation implementing HMDA, has 
undergone a number of revisions. It requires that lenders report both the 
geographic location of originated loans and information about denied mortgage 
loan applications. 55 As of 1990, lenders also must report the race, sex and 
income of the applicant.56 HMDA began requiring lenders to report price data 
in 2002, and by 2004 the price data began to show disturbing trends. African-
American and Hispanic borrowers received more of the higher priced loans 
than whites.57 Since the 2004 reporting year, lenders must report loan price 
information in the form of "rate spread.,,58 A subsequent study by the Federal 
Reserve found that at least thirty percent of the disparity was left unexplained 
by factors such as income and loan size.59 
HMDA identifies price disparities through loan pricing.6o Lenders must 
report higher priced loans that exceed either certain price points or thresholds 
of the loan's adjusted annual percentage rates (APRs). This requirement 
applies only to loans with spreads above the pre-determined price points.61 
55. The Federal Reserve uncovered lenders' discriminatory pricing policies by examining 
individual Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the distinct geographical markets in which 
lenders made loans to determine if the lender's pricing policies and product offerings were in 
violation. Testimony of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs, 
Fed. Reserve Bd., Hearing on Fair Lending and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Hearing 
before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. I 10th Congo (July 
25, 2007) (tcstimony of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Div. of Consumcr and Cmty. Affairs, 
Fcd. Rescrvc Bd.), available at, http://www.federalrcserve.gov/newscvents/testimony/ 
Braunstein20070725a.htm. C ... HMDA data are most helpful as a fair lending tool when they are 
used in conjunction with other risk factors and supervisory information to identify institutions 
that warrant closer review."). 
56. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 1211, 103 
Stat. 183,525-26 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803); Jason Dietrich, Missing Race Data in HMDA 
and the Implications for the Monitoring ofF air Lending Compliance 3 (Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency Econ. and Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 2001-1, 2001). 
57. Robert Avery, Glen Canner & Robert Cook, New Information Reported under HMDA 
and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, FED. RESERYE Bo. (2004), available at 
http://www . fedcralreserve.gov /pubslbulletinl2005/summer05 _ hmda.pdf. 
58. DARRYL E. GETIER, CONGo RESEARCH SERY., REPORTING ISSUES UNDER THE HOME 
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT, RL34720, GOy'T & FIN. DIY. 3 (2008). Institutions must report 
the rate spread between the annual percentage rate (APR) and the average prime offer for a 
comparative transaction as of the date the interest rate is set. See Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, A Guide to HMDA Reporting (2003), http://www.ffiec.govlhmdalpdf/ 
2004guide.pdf. 
59. Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based 
Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REY. 677, 683-86 (2009); see also Judith A. Giles & Marsha J. 
Courchane, Stratified Sample Design for Fair Lending Binary Logit Models 4 (Econometrics, 
Working Paper No. EWP0007, 2000), available at http://www.uvic.ealsocialsciences/economics/ 
assets/docs/econometrics/ewp0007.pdf (positing that logistic regressions are commonly used 
inaccurately to assess for fair lending across groups ofloan applications). 
60. See generally id. at 2-4 (2008) (analyzing HMDA reporting requirements). 
61. HMDA Glossary, FED. FIN. iNSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiee.gov/ 
hmdaiglossary.htm#R (last modified Sept. 27, 2014) ("The price data take the form of a "rate 
spread." Lenders must report the spread (difference) between the annual percentage rate (APR) 
on a loan and the rate on Treasury securities of comparable maturity - but only for loans with 
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Loans that are designated as having status under the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act, or "HOEPA status," provide further insight into a 
lender's practices and may signal the need for a regulatory fair lending 
examination based on possible discrimination.62 Loans above the pre-
determined price points signal pricing disparities.63 Moreover, the disparities 
are also tied to the lender offering the loan product.64 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in 2010.65 This massive piece of legislation was 
Congress' reaction to the 2007 financial crisis. Articles X and XIV present 
significant changes regarding the regulation of the mortgage origination 
process and mortgage loan products. The Dodd-Frank amendments to HMDA 
identified additional data needed to uncover indicates pricing disparities.66 
Article X of Dodd-Frank amends HMDA by requiring additional data 
collection about borrowers.67 The amendments facilitate fair lending litigation 
by requiring compilation of more detailed borrower characteristics. In addition 
to race, ethnicity, sex, and income, lenders are now required to record and 
report the age and credit score of the borrower, the census tract of the 
mortgaged property, the value of the property pledged as collateral for the 
loan, and a clear description of the loan product sold.68 The goal is to make it 
easier to statistically compare borrowers and determine which borrowers 
received subprime loans. Article X also imposes new reporting requirements 
on loans. Lenders must report more detailed information about the proposed 
loan product, including: the total points and fees payable at origination; the 
spreads above designated thresholds. So, rate spreads arc reported for some, but not all, reported 
home loans. The rate spread, along with Lien Status and HOEPA hclp interpret the pricing 
data."). 
62. Further, lenders arc required to identify loans that are subject to the HOEPA. See 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (200S) (stating requirements for types of closed-end home 
mortgages.) Dodd-Frank also amended several HOEPA provisions. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1001-1100,124 Stat. 1376, 
1955-2113 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1431-33). 
63. Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Beveroot, Glenn B. Canner & Christa N. 
Gibbs, The 2008 HMDA Data: The Mortgage Market During a Turbulent Year. FED. RES. BULL., 
A 169, A 177 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/8ulletinl201O/pdf/ 
hmdaOSfinal.pdf. Subprime loans nearly doubled from 2004-2005. They accounted for 15.5 
percent of all approved mortgages in 2004. In 2005 and 2006, they were 26.2 percent and 2S.7 
percent, respectively. Id.at AIS4. That percentage declined to IS.3 percent by 2007. fd. 
64. See John L. Ropiequet, Nathan O. Lundby, Kenneth J. Rojc & Sara B. Lubezny, Update 
on ECOA and Fair Lending Developments, 63 Bus. LAW. 663,666 (200S) ("FRB researchers 
who studied the expanded HMDA data have emphasized that the data is insufficient, by itself, to 
establish [Equal Credit Opportunity Act] violations by lenders."). 
65. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§1001-1100, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010). 
66. /d. § 1094. 
67. See id. 
6S. Id. 
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term of the loan; and, the "channel through which application was made, 
including retail, broker.,,69 
Article XIV defines several key factors in the mortgage process that 
protect consumers. Specifically, it defines the qualified mortgage produceo 
and requires that each loan be evaluated for the borrower's ability to repay.7! 
This provision serves as a prohibition against those subprime loan products 
that are so inferior that they are not sustainable. The definition of a mortgage 
originator is also significant. The broad definition includes any person who 
receives compensation for taking a loan application, assists a consumer in 
obtaining a loan, prepares loan packages, collects information on available 
loans for a consumer, or negotiates loan offers or terms for a consumer.72 
Finally, Article XIV limits the compensation that mortgage originators can 
receive, which removes the incentive for originators to steer consumers 
towards more onerous loan products. 73 
2. The Persistent Concerns over HMDA and Fair Lending 
Enforcement 
The initial value of the HMDA data is that it provides a point of 
comparison for loan performance and a lender's denial rate for both minority 
and white applicants. Subsequent revisions to the statute and its regulations 
have proven responsive to the chang in,? dynamics of the mortgage market and 
evidence of perceived discrimination. 7 
Congress has changed HMDA to improve its accuracy. It expanded both 
the group of mortgage lenders required to report and the reporting of borrower 
and applicant demographics.75 In response to the rise of subprime and 
69. ld. Other identifying information about the loan product includes: the loan APR as 
compared to all loans by the lender; any prepayment penalties associated with the loan; the 
number of months after which the interest rate may change; payments other than fully amortizing 
payments during any portion of the loan term. 
70. ld. § 1412. A "qualified mortgage" is a residential mortgage loan. The regular periodic 
payments for the loan cannot increase the principal balance or allow the consumer to defer 
repayment of principal. ld. § 14 I 2(A)(i). The loan has points and fees that total less than 3 
percent of the total loan amount. ld. § 1412(A)(vii). 
71. ld. § 1402. 
72. See id. § 140 I (cc)(2). 
73. See id. § 1403( c)( I). 
74. A 1988 Pulitzer-Prize winning series in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Color of 
Money, documented the flow of funds into Atlanta's black neighborhoods and is credited 
indirectly with focusing national attention on mortgage lending discrimination again. The patterns 
of discriminatory lending in Atlanta prompted a Justice Department investigation into the 
mortgage lending practices of Atlanta banks and a change in HMDA's reporting requirements. 
See Justice Department Launches Probe of Discrimination among Dozens of Atlanta Banks and 
S&Ls, 52 BANKING REp. (BNA) 945 (May I, \989); see also Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recover, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73 § 1211, 103 Stat. 183, 524 (\989); 12 
U.S.c. § 2803 (2011) (HMDA reporting requirements amended to require greater disclosure of 
financial institutions' lending practices by income level, race, and gender). 
75. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2009). 
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predatory lending, the Federal Reserve expanded the information reported 
under HMDA to include pricing?6 Specifically, lenders were required to 
collect and publicly disclose information about mortgages with APRs above 
certain designated thresholds.77 The Federal Reserve used the information on 
high-priced loans to run statistical analyses that compared loans made to 
minorities with loans made to non-Hispanic whites. These analyses calculated 
the disparities in rate spread by race, ethnicity, and the incidence of higher 
priced loans, and ultimately developed an 'outlier list.,78 Even with the 
changes, the HMDA data did not provide a full picture of the sub prime 
market.79 The HMDA data ignores potential discrimination in the prime and 
government-guaranteed mortgage markets because it focuses on assessing 
mortgage pricing disparities among subprime lenders to the exclusion of 
lenders that may offer prime, conventional mortgages or government-
guaranteed mortgages.80 
HMDA data has proven useful in identifying the geographic patterns and 
continuous incidences of risk-based loans. The data is also key in determining 
who the market garticipants are-e.g., banks, affiliates and independents-and 
loan dispersion. I However, the geographic information that HMDA provides 
can be misleading for several reasons. First, HMDA does not require 
depositary institutions located in non-metropolitan areas to report loan 
information.82 Second, the mortgage lending information may be incomplete 
76. The FRB justified expanding the reporting requirements to inelude pricing data because 
they dominate the sub-subprimc market. The comment from community and civil rights groups 
advocated for the change hoping that data availability would increase fair lending enforcement. 
See generally Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported 
under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 391-94 
(2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubslbulletinl2005/summer05 _ hmda.pdf 
(discussing the limitations of using the enhanced HMDA data requirements requiring loan pricing 
as a basis for uncovering unfair lending while noting preliminary indications that minorities arc 
more likely to obtain credit from institutions in the higher-priced market segment). 
77. KATHRYN L.S. PETTIT & AUDREY E. DROESCH, THE URBAN INST., A GUIDE TO HOME 
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT DATA 13 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/ 
1001247_ hdma.pdf. 
78. The Federal Reserve shares this information with other state and federal regulators. 
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note I, at 14-16 (discussing the fair lending 
examination process for the federal financial institution regulatory agencies). 
77 PETTIT & DROESCH, supra note 75, at 9 ("The number of subprime loans, however, can be 
approximated by calculating the number of loans originated by lenders identified by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as subprime specialists. Because these 
subprime specialists might also offer traditional prime-market loans ... "). 
80. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note I, at 18-19. 
81. Ropiequet, Lundby, Roie & Lubezny, supra note 62, at 666. There is also an 
inconsistency in the regulatory framework between HMDA requirements and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA). ECOA prohibits lenders from collecting personal characteristics, such 
as race, ethnicity, and sex. The decision not to require such reporting hinders federal oversight 
and academic research. See discussion supra note 60. 
82. PETTIT & DROESCH, supra note 75, at 6; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2011). 
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when institutions that are not required to file under HDMA make mortgages.83 
Non-depository institutions do not have to report the census tract location of 
I d . I' 84 oans rna e III non-metropo ltan areas. 
The criticisms of HMDA data surround its use and dispute whether it can 
accurately prove the existence of lending discrimination. While it is generally 
accepted that the data alone is insufficient to control for all of the relevant 
differences between borrowers, it does highlight lenders who should be subject 
to further investigation.85 Because HMDA data does not include underwriting 
information, it is difficult to determine from the data alone why lenders may 
charge certain borrowers higher interest rates or fees. 86 Additionally, much of 
the criticism of HMDA centers around the way that community groups and 
housing activists use HMDA data. Community organizations and concerned 
citizens successfully used HMDA data as a tool to increase bank reinvestment 
lending.87 This information is crucial when banks apply to regulators for 
mergers. The HMDA data assist regulators in determining whether banks have 
been meeting the lending needs of the community under the CRA.88 During 
the CRA examination process and when a bank files a regulatory expansion 
application, community groups may submit written comments on the bank's 
community reinvestment performance.89 This type of advocacy makes lenders 
83. It is particularly problcmatic to rcly on HMDA data to show disparitics in non-
metropolitan and low-homeownership areas. PETTIT & DROESCH, supra note 75, at 6. 
Institutions are only required to enter property location information for loans originated within 
the metropolitan areas in which they have a branch. 12 C.F.R. § 1003.5(3)(i) (2011). Institutions 
do not have to idcntify the census tract for properties located in counties with populations of less 
than 30,000 people. PETTIT & DROESCH, supra note 75, at 6. HMDA data also has limitations 
when considering the changes in neighborhoods that have low demographics of home ownership 
rates. Id. These are neighborhoods comprised of multi-family units. Id. The demographic and 
economic changes in these neighborhoods arc ambiguous because the multi-family market does 
not specifically idcntify the number of units in a building. Id. 
84. CFPB's recently amcnded HMDA rcgulations would require all institutions that make 
25 loans to rcport. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 79 Fed. Rcg. 51732 (Aug. 29, 2014) (to be 
codified at CFPB-20 14-00 19). 
85. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & FELICITY SKIDMORE, MORTGAGE LENDING 
DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE 9 (1999) ("Even though HMDA data now 
include borrowers' race and income, they do not includc critical information on thc wcalth and 
debt levels of loan applicants, their credit histories, the charactcristics of properties serving as 
collateral, the terms of loans for which applications werc submitted, or the underwriting criteria 
used to determine eligibility"). 
86. See Frequently Asked Questions about HMDA, WELLS FARGO, https://www08. 
wellsfargomedia.com/downloads/pdf/aboutlhmda _faq.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
87. See Lee v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 118 F.3d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 
1997) (where community groups sought to overturn Federal Reserve Board's merger approvals 
based on the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods). 
88. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 §§ 804(a)(l)--{2), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903(a)(l)-(2) 
(2008). 
89. See Michael E. Schrader, Competition and Convenience: The Emerging Role of 
Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. L.J. 331, 344 (1992) (discussing CRA financial commitments 
that financial institutions make when community groups protest a bank merger). 
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accountable, and is exactly what Congress had in mind when the statute was 
passed.90 
Dodd-Frank is pro-consumer regarding litigation to enforce the fair 
lending laws. The statute implicitly approves the disparate impact theory by 
forbidding any lending practice that promotes "disparities among consumers of 
equal credit worthiness but of different race, ethnicity, gender or age.,,91 It also 
creates a new private right of action for violation of laws against steering and 
predatory lending and also awards the successful liti~ant treble damages, costs, 
and attorney's fees associated with the action.9 Borrowers who face 
foreclosure proceedings have the right to bring an ability to repay action 
against the lender and to seek a recoupment or offset for the damages of such a 
violation.93 
As discussed below, even with these changes, the issue of discretionary 
pricing has not been abated. More reforms are needed if borrowers and the 
home finance market are to operate efficiently and fairly. 
B. The Changed Mortgage Market and Lender Discretion 
The mortgage market has changed dramatically in the last two decades and 
now delivers .more diverse product offerings, including risk-based pricing. 
Consequently, a wider group of borrowers receive mortgage approvals. In 
order to understand whether and to what extent lenders can exercise discretion 
in risk-based loans, this section first considers the changed mortgage market. 
It explains how the present funding structure creates lending discretion. Then 
the discussion turns to how lenders use statistical analysis in lending, which is 
an issue underlying the proposed changes to HMDA data discussed in Part IV. 
1. Price Variability and Loan Channels 
Risk-based pricing has led to more granularity or variance and divisibility 
in pricing. Prior to the development of a wide, risk-based product market, 
lenders had less than five mortgage products and operated in local or regional 
markets.94 Most lenders chose between offering prime or sub-prime loans, but 
rarely offered both. Brokers rarely originated loans. Borrowers with impaired 
credit were simply denied loans.95 
90. Active community involvement in HMDA enforcement along with changes to the 
regulatory process have played a significant role in making lenders accountable. U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note I, at 19-20. 
91. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 65, § 1403(c)(3)(C). 
92. Id. § 1404. 
93. See id. 
94. See generally K.S. Gerardi, H. S. Rosen & P. S. Willen, The Impact of Deregulation 
and Financial Innovation on Consumers: The Case of the Mortgage Market, 65 J. OF FIN. 333, 
333-360 (2010). 
95. Id. 
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The mortgage market is today national in scope and offers scores of 
products. Lenders operate in both the prime and sub-prime markets, have 
multiple origination channels, and choose to offer borrowers a high-rate 
product rather than deny the 10an.96 The increased access to credit for credit-
impaired borrowers gives lenders significant discretion in pricing and creates 
pricing variability.97 
Pricing variability creates more opportunities to service a more diverse 
population of borrowers. It also offers more opportunities for prices to vary 
significantly and for fair lending disparities to exist. The solution is to 
encourage transparent reporting of variances. The lender's data then provides 
a basis for evaluating the pricing for fair lending disparities.98 Variable pricing 
can lead to fair lending disparities, however, when cost-based or competition-
based discretion is allowed and not fully documented.99 
The traditional method of retail lending involved a loan officer at a 
bank. 100 The bank originated, funded, and serviced the loan. Mortgage 
funding today may involve multiple layers of financial mediation. 101 The 
mortgage loan originates through one of three channels: retail, mortgage 
broker, or correspondent. 102 All three of these loan originators are independent 
contractors who use warehouse credit lines to fund mortgage loans. 103 
96. 8.J. Keys, T. MukhCIjee, A. Seru & V. Vig, Did Securitization Lead To Lax Screening? 
Evidence/rom Subprime Loans, 125 Q. 1. OF ECON. 307, 307-62 (2010) (positing that in the 
subprime market securitization lowered the screening incentives of loan originators for subprime 
borrowers). 
97. Pricc variability is also known as risk-based pricing. See WILLIAM C. APGAR & 
ALLEGRA CALDER, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence 0/ Discrimination in Mortgage 
Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 116-17 (Xavier de Souza Briggs cd., Dec. 2005), available at http:// 
www .jchs.harvard.cdulsites/jchs.harvard.eduifiles/w05-II.pdf. 
98. Known factors can normalize prices, which can be expressed as overages. Jack M. 
Guttentag, What is a Mortgage "Overage?", THE MORTGAGE PROFESSOR (last updated Jan. 19, 
20 II), http://www.mtgprofessor.com/a%20-%20shopping%20for%20a%20mortgage/what_is_an 
_ overage.htm. 
99. See Avery, Canner & Cook, supra note 57, at 369-70. 
100. See id. at 349. Correspondent lending is a combination of retail, channel, and 
wholesale channel lending. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MORTGAGE ORIGINATION 
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 7 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fI201401_efpb_mortgage 
-origination-exam-procedures.pdf. Correspondent lenders may fund mortgages from warehouse 
lines of credit or other funds. Id. 
101. Financial intermediation is the process of indirectly transferring funds between lenders 
and borrowers. Mark P. Gergen, Subchapter K and Passive Financial intermediation, 51 SMU 
L. REv. 37, 37-38 (1997). 
102. See WILLIAM APGAR, AMAL BENDIMERAD & REN S. ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. 
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MORTGAGE MARKET CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN 
ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA 7 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edulsites/jchs. 
harvard.eduifiles/mm07 -2_ mortgage _ market_ channels.pdf. 
103. Cassandra Jones Havard, "Goin' Round in Circles" ... and Letting the Bad Loans Win: 
When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need/or Uniform Mortgage Broker Regulation, 
86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 781 (2008). 
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Correspondents, however, may either fund mortgage loans themselves on a 
short-term basis or match mortgage brokers with wholesale lenders, who then 
provide the funds. 104 However in none of these situations are the loan 
originators agents of the ultimate mortgage funder. 
The warehouse or wholesale lender is a final mortgage funder. The 
warehouse lender sets the underwriting standards and provides an advance 
commitment on price. 105 Wholesale lenders enter into contractual agreements 
with the originating lender, retail bank, mortgage broker or correspondent to 
fund loans. In the wholesale channel, a bank or mortgage broker actually 
solicits the loan and takes the application from the consumer. 106 As 
independent contractors, the loan originators (mortgage brokers, banks, 
correspondents) are not employees of the wholesale lender. 107 The status of 
loan originator also has limitations. The wholesale lender, not the originating 
lender, makes the underwriting decisions and reviews the documentation to 
accept or reject the loan before actually releasing funds. 108 
The link between the source of the funds, pricing variability, and pricing 
disparity becomes apparent given how lendin/8 involves statistical analysis and 
model-based approaches to evaluate profit. I 9 Variable pricing allows the 
lenders, both originating and wholesale, to define the market and the profit 
expectations of that market. The increase in sub-prime lending has a direct 
correlation to both the secondary market demands for more of these loans as 
well as the ability to price risk differently.llo When the pricing moves from 
104. /d. at 749-51 (discussing how the broker models makes mortgage lenders more 
efficient and responsive to changing market conditions). 
105. See discussion infra in text surrounding note 173. 
106. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MORTGAGE ORIGINATION EXAMINATION 
PROCEDURES 6-7 (2014), available at http://files.consumcrfinancc.gov/f/201401_cfpb_mortgage-
origination-exam-procedures. pdf. Throughout the remainder of this article, the term "originating 
lender" refers to banks, mortgage brokers and correspondent lenders who usc warehouse loans to 
fund mortgages. 
107. /d.; see also REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM C. ApGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD 
MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 7, 29 (2007), available at http://www. 
j ehs.harvard. edulsites/j ehs.harvard. eduifiles/mm071_ mortgage _ market_behavior. pdf. Mortgage 
brokers usually have relationships with multiple mortgage lenders and offer different mortgage 
loan products from these lenders. The advent of mortgage brokers raised the issue of suitability 
and whether the broker was indeed making the correct recommendation of loan product to the 
buyer. Jd. at 7. 
108. See APGAR, BENDIMERAD & ESSENE, supra note 102, at 7-8. By 2005, wholesale 
lending operations funded 56 percent of all prime loans and 78 percent of all non-prime loans. 
109. Mortgage loans have an objective and a subjective price component. The objective 
component is derived from risk-based factors, such as credit scores. Essentially, the objective 
component is based on the customer's creditworthiness. The subjective component consists of 
fees irr,posed by the lenders. These fees are discretionary charges sueh as overages or yield spread 
premiums. Richard R. Paee & Lawrence B. Norland, Monitoring Loan Pricing for Fair Lending 
Compliance, A.B.A. BANK COMPLIANCE, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 32, 36-40, available at https:llww 
w.pwc.eom/en _ US/us/financial-services/fair -Iending-eomplianee-serviees/lessons _learned. pdf. 
110. Robert G. Sehwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage 
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objective indictors of creditworthiness to subjective pncmg that includes 
unjustifiable discretionary fees, price variability becomes pricing disparity. 
Discrimination in credit markets is statistically significant enough to have 
a negative effect on loan approvals and rates. 111 In the risk-based mortgage 
market, loan channels segment borrowers based on individual and group 
characteristics and geographical considerations. 112 There are a multiplicity of 
loan products available to credit-impaired borrowers. 113 Evidence shows that 
mortgage originators may presumptively offer minority borrowers who are not 
credit-impaired higher priced loans before first validating cost-based 
differences between the loan products. 114 Lenders who discriminate against 
minority borrowers that are as equally qualified as white borrowers may be 
justifying decision-making on the "lower or more variable future earned-
income levels.,,115 These circumstances all raise critical issues of regulatory 
impact and policy. 
As an integral part of the mortgage financing process, warehouse lenders 
have control over a substantial flow of the funds. The regulatory concern 
regarding wholesale lenders is whether they allow too much discretionary 
decision-making when providing funds. Originating lenders are not agents of 
the wholesale lenders and in that regard do not expose the wholesale lender to 
liability. Yet, the warehouse lender's failure to infonn and monitor the 
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 379-S0 (2010). See 
generally Gretchen Morgensen, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. S, 
2007, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.cOml2007/04/0SlbusineSS/YOUrmOneY/OSgret. 
html?pageWanted=all& J=O. 
Ill. Gary A. Dymski, Is Discrimination Disappearing? Residential Credit Market 
Evidence, 1992-98, 2S INT'LJ. Soc. ECON. 1025, 1031 (2001). 
112. Alan M. White, Subprime Mortgage and Discriminatory Lending: Borrowing While 
Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.c. L. REv. 677, 6S7 
(2009); Jared Ruiz Bybee, Fair Lending 2.0: A Borrower-Based Solution to Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 113, 125 (2011) (stating that most minority 
borrowers choose to usc higher-priced mortgage brokers instead of federally regulated banks). 
113. Cassandra Jones Havard, "Goin' Round in Circles" ... and Letting the Bad Loans 
Win-When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Mortgage Broker 
Regulation, S6 NEB. L. REV. 737,751,753 (200S). 
114. Maya Sen, Quantifying Discrimination: The Role of Race and Gender in the Awarding 
of Subprime Mortgage Loans, 3 (Harvard Univ. Dept. of Gov., Working Paper, 2010) (defining 
individual discrimination as individual lenders discriminating against identically situated 
borrowers) available at http://www.gov.harvard.eduifiles/uploads/sen.subprime_O.pdf; see also 
ROBERT J. GARY-BOBO, SOPHIE LARRIBEAU, University of Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA A 
STRUCTURAL MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING, WITH SOME EVIDENCE ON 
NEUTRAL GROUND 3 (1999) (positing that detecting discrimination in mortgage markets is made 
more complex by the discrimination present in other markets, such as the labor and housing 
markets) available at http://dev3.cepr.org/meets/wkcnl3/351 O/papcrslbobo.pdf; see also Devah 
Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, 
Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REv. OF SOC. lSI-209 (200S). 
115. Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and Housing Markets: Findings and 
Challenges, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 215, 222 (William M. 
Rodgers III ed., 2006), available at http://economics.ucr.eduipapers/papers02/02-IS.pdf. 
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originating lenders for discriminatory lending is a non-delegable duty. I 16 The 
uneven access to sustainable, affordable financial services results in the 
disadvantageous, predatory products and services that constitute subprime 
lending. ll7 The implications of efficient, robust pricing variability are that 
warehouse lenders must exercise greater effort to monitor lenders' policies and 
practices for fair lending. This need to monitor is arguably more stringent in 
the wholesale lending channel, which has a broad reach, but arguably is devoid 
fd ' . h h' 118 o lrect overslg taut onty. 
Creating a synergy between fair lending and safety and soundness can 
provide access to credit in fair and equitable ways. Policy changes regarding 
access to credit in minority economic communities must recognize the base 
inequality that structural discrimination invariably creates." 9 The recent 
Department of Justice (DOJ) fair lending settlements resulted in such an 
inquiry of lenders. 
116. The Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) prohibitions extend to warehouse 
lenders because the statute explicitly prohibits "any person or other entity whose business 
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person 
in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because 
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) 
(2006). "Residential real estate-related transaction" includes "the making or purchasing of loans . 
. . for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling" or loans that arc 
"secured by residential real estate." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b). See generally Joshua w. Dixon, The 
Case Against A Nondelegable Duty on Owners to Prevent Fair Housing Act Violations, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1318 (2002). 
117. Economic clusters developed primarily due arc the public policies and private industry 
practices that created inequities in housing and housing finance. These policies and practices 
created the racial and economic structure of neighborhoods and consequently of the country's 
housing market. The uneven access to financial services results in disadvantageous products and 
services of subprime lending. Squires identifies some structural inequity factors affecting access 
to financial services as (I) intimidation and violence by neighborhood "improvement" societies to 
maintain the "character" of communities; (2) explicit discriminatory policies that virtually 
excluded non-whites from FHA and other government insured loan programs in the 1930s to the 
I 960s and fueled suburban development at the expense of central cities; (3) refusal of real estate 
and rental agents to provide similar levels of service to white and non-white clients, including 
steering of clients to communities based on their race and that of the neighborhoods; (4) redlining 
by financial institutions (including the refusal to provide financing for many years and predatory 
lending more recently); (5) concentration of public housing complexes in inner city ghettos and 
barrios; and (6) exclusionary zoning ordinances existing in most suburbs that limit or prohibit 
multi-family housing and other affordable housing units. Gregory D. Squires, Urban 
Development and Unequal Access to Housing Finance Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 
263-64 (2008-2009). 
I 18. Several DOJ settlements involved wholesale lenders, but these loans are not subject to 
the same direct regulatory review as loans made through traditional origination channels. See 
discussion infra note 114. 
119. The borrower's financial condition is a critical factor that may limit the lender's 
causation. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A 
View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325,354 (1996) (discussing disparate 
impact and causation in employer context). 
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2. Lenders' Discretion and Anti-Discrimination 
Despite the fair lending laws, which ought to restrain lenders' conduct, 
widespread concern persists over the abuse of lender discretion in the context 
of risk-based pricing. 120 The most widely cited and well-documented concerns 
are the high incidence of subprime, equity-stripping loans that lenders make to 
minority borrowers who are otherwise qualified for prime loans. 121 The extent 
to which lenders appear to engage in this type of discrimination without 
regulatory scrutiny of lending practices that are, at least presumptively, illegal 
is difficult to reconcile with the intent of the law. 122 
From 2010-2012, pricing discretion became one of the theories used to 
establish mortgage lenders' violations of fair lending laws. The DO] alleged 
that warehouse lenders failed to monitor loan originations and failed to prohibit 
loan officers and brokers from adding fees and interest rate mark-ups that 
increased their own compensation. 123 Using HMDA data, the complaints also 
120. See Carol Neeole Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 907, 920, 951 (2010) (arguing that the cultural affinity hypothcsis cxplains how "lenders 
discriminate against borrowers with whom they do not have a cultural affinity," and therefore 
Icnders have no mcaningful context to evaluatc a borrower's creditworthiness). 
121. According to a study conducted by thc Ccnter for Responsible Lending, African-
American borrowers were anywhere from 6 percent to 34 percent more likely to receive a higher-
rate loan than white borrowers with similar qualifications; and Latino borrowers were 29 percent 
to 142 percent more likely to receive a higher loan rate than white borrowers with similar 
qualifications. Debbie Gruenstcin Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect 
of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 19-
20 (May 31, 2006), http://www.rcsponsiblclcnding.org/mortgage-Icnding/research-analysis/rrO 11-
Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf. The authors based this study on a proprietary subprime loan data set, 
which supplemented HDMA data. This racial disparity in subprime lending is evident regardless 
of borrowers' income-levels or risk-related credit factors. Id. at 3. The study breaks the data 
down by Loan To Value (LTV), Fair Is sacs Company (FICO) credit score range, and race. The 
data indicates that that of the borrowers with the best credit historics, i.c., thc lowest risk 
categorics-LTV below 80 perccnt and FICO scorc above 680--African Amcricans were 65 
perccnt more likely to receive subprime loans than their similarly situated whitc counterparts for 
purchasing a home and 124 percent more likely when rcfinancing. Id. at 11-12 tbls. 2-3. 
122. See WILLIAM C. APGAR & ALLEGRA CALDER, The Dual Mortgage Market: The 
Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: 
RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101, 111-12 (Xavicr de Souza Briggs 
ed., 2005) (describing discrimination in housing and mortgage markets as "more subtle"), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w05-II.pdf. This point is 
hard to reconcile with the advances in the market that, in effect, kept the regulatory structurc at 
least onc step behind the advances in products offered in the marketplace. Id. at 118. 
123. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, United States v. AIG Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 1:IOCVI78 (D. 
Del. Mar. 4, 2010) [hercinafter AIG Complaint] (wholesale lender charged with failure to 
supervise mortgage brokers), available at www.justice.gov/crt/aboutlhce/documents/aigcomp. 
pdf; Complaint at 3, United Statcs v. Countrywide Fin., No. CVII 10540 PSG (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 28,2011) [hereinafter Countrywide Complaint] (wholesale lender charged with failure to 
supervise its employees and brokers), available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ 
eountrywidecomp.pdf; Complaint at 3-5, United States v. Wells Fargo, No. 12-520 (J08) (D.D.C 
July 12, 2012) [hereinaftcr Wells Fargo complaint] (wholesale lender charged with failurc to 
supervise loan originations), available at www.justice.gov/crt/aboutlhce/documcnts/wellsfargo 
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identified the pricing differentials between minority and white borrowers. 124 
The lenders, as in most of the fair lending enforcement cases, resolved the 
litigation with the entry of a contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous 
consent decree. 125 What is significant about the consent decrees that DOJ 
entered into is that the remedial action sought is to reduce or eliminate 
discretionary pricing. Specifically, the lenders consented to DOJ's ongoing 
supervision of the fair lending programs, implementation of pricing and 
monitoring programs and policies, close supervision by senior management 
including, providing written explanations whenever a pricing differential 
deviates from the bank's interest rate sheets, and documenting a specific, 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the rate differential. 126 
These settlements made fair lendin~ laws more meaningful by imposing 
limits on lenders' discretionary actions. 1 Using statistical disparities as a way 
eomp.pdf;Complaint at 3 United States v. Southport, No. Case No. 13-CV-\086-JPS (E.D. Wis. 
Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Southport complaint] (charged higher broker fees on wholesale 
mortgage loans made to African-American and Hispanic borrowers as compared to non-Hispanic 
white borrowers), available at http://www.justiee.gov/ert/aboutlhee/doeuments/southport/ 
sp_eomplaint_2013-09-26.pdf,' Complaint at 3, United States v. Plaza Home, No. 13-C-1086 
(E.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Plaza Home complaint], available at www.justiee. 
gov/ert/aboutlhee/doeuments/plazahomeeomp.pdf. 
124. See, e.g., AIG Complaint at" 15; Countrywide Complaint at ~" 38-41; Wells Fargo 
Complaint at ",,66-74; Southport Complaint at ""17, 19; Plaza Home Complaint at ""16, 18, 
20,22. 
125. See, e.g., Consent Order, United States v. AIG Fed. Say. Bank, No. 1:IOCVI78 (D. 
Del. Mar. 24 2010) [hereinafter AIG Consent Order], available at http://www.justiee.gov/ert/ 
aboutlhee/doeuments/eountrywidesettle.pdf; Consent Order, United States v. Countrywide Fin., 
No. CVII 10540 PSG (AJW) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Countrywide Consent 
Order], available at http://www.justiee.gov/ert/about/hee/doeuments/eountrywidesettle.pdf; 
Consent Order, United States v. Wells Fargo, No. 12-520 (JOB) (D.D.C. July 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Wells Fargo Consent Order], available at http://www.justiee.gov/ert/aboutlhee/ 
documents/wellsfargosettle.pdf; Consent Order, United States v. Southport, No. l3-CV-I086-JPS 
(E.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2013); Consent Order, United States v. Plaza Home, No. 13-C-I086 (E.D. 
Wis. Oct. I, 2013) [hereinafter Plaza Home Consent Order], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
ert/about/hee/doeuments/plazahome/ph _settle. pdf. 
126. The settlements required lenders continuing in operation to implement specific policies 
and procedures to avoid discrimination, including employee training. See AIG Consent Order, at 
"" 4-9 (lending pricing and procedures), " 8 (monitoring), ,,~ 11-13 (employee and broker 
training); Wells Fargo Consent Order at "" 4-8 (lending policies and procedures), "" 9-11 
(monitoring), ,,~ 13-16 (employee and broker training), "" 39-40 (evaluating and monitoring); 
Plaza Home Consent Order, supra note 125, at "" 3-7 (lending policies and procedures), " 8 
(monitoring), ~~ 11-14 (employee and broker training); United States v. Plaza Home, No. 13-C-
1086 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 26,2013). AIG no longer makes warehouse loans, but agreed to implement 
policies and procedures eliminating discretionary pricing by employees and brokers if it re-enters 
the wholesale lending business. See, e.g., AIG Consent Order (Intro.). 
Countrywide and Southport are no longer operational. These institutions agreed to injunctive 
relief to prevent the recurrence of the alleged unlawful lending practices in the event they re-enter 
the residential mortgage lending business. Countrywide Consent Order at ~ 2; United States v. 
Southport, Case No. 13-CV-1086-JPS (E.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2013). 
127. See generally discussion surrounding note 133. 
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to determine either the lack of monitoring or a failure to take action, DO] 
established that lenders were failing to examine their credit operations for 
potential disparate impact. 128 Fair lending rules, while antithetical to arbitrary 
and discriminatory pricing, are ineffective at preempting risk-based, or any 
other, pricing that is discriminatory. An inherent conflict exists between the 
legality of rational discrimination and the protections borrowers deserve from 
lenders making decisions that result in either disparate treatment or disparate 
. 129 Impact. . 
The success of the DO] fair lending settlements hinged on the government 
being able to fashion a remedy that both monitors and eliminates pricing 
disparities. 13o The HMDA data was critically important in showing a pattern 
and practice of discriminatory conduct. However, two things are significant 
about the use of that data. First, as intended by HMDA, the data is a post-hoc 
evaluation of lending discrimination and therefore only deters future lending 
violations. Second, the evidentiary basis for establishing a specific policy in 
some cases is difficult to sustain when the lender's policy is to allow discretion 
in decision-making. Nonetheless, the impressive outcome resulting in liability 
against wholesale lending abuses begs the question of HMDA's efficacy in 
preventing discriminatory pricing. How existing fair lending case law 
interferes with HMDA as a preemptive measure in thwarting lending abuse is 
discussed below.13I 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HMDA, LENDER DISCRETION 
AND FAIR LENDING 
In order to understand whether and to what extent risk-based pricing 
delegates to lenders excessive discretion in loan pricing, this section first 
considers how courts generally have interpreted discretionary policies under 
Title VII. It then discusses the business justification doctrine and how that rule 
may be flawed in the context of risk-based pricing. This discussion of fair 
lending enforcement reveals a disconnect between fair lending rules and their 
enforcement. The breakdown occurs in two ways. First, plaintiffs alleging 
discrimination cannot meet the required evidentiary burden when the court 
128. See. e.g., AIG Complaint at ~I 17; Countrywide Complaint at ~I 93; Wel1s Fargo 
Complaint at ~177; Southport Complaint at ~124; Plaza Home Complaint at ~127. 
129. Economists who support statistical discrimination argue it is validly based on a 
statistical analysis of accuratc information regarding borrowers. See generally Edmund S. 
Phclps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972) 
(positing a thcory of statistical discrimination). 
130. Many of the fair lending settlements were based on al1egations of discriminatory 
pricing or steering and the lenders' lack of effective fair lending monitoring or corrective action. 
In some cases, potential liability can go as far back as 2004. See discussion supra notes 123-24. 
131. See generally John L. Ropiequet, Assessing the Impact of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes on Fair Lending Litigation, 21 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING 195, 215-21 (2012). 
[hereinafter Ropiequet, Assessing the Impact of Wal-Mart Stores] (discussing the advances in 
using statistical evidence to prove disparate impact in fair lending litigation). 
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finds that subjective, discretionary decision-making lacks the specificity 
required to support a lending discrimination claim. Second, the court's 
evaluation of the lender's business justification is not properly tailored to an 
inquiry into reasonable business conduct. 
A. Disparate Impact Doctrine 
Disparate impact occurs "when a lender applies a racially or otherwise 
neutral policy or practice equally to all credit applicants, but the policy or 
practice disproportionately excludes or burdens certain persons on a 
prohibited basis.,,132 As a theory of liabili7' it has often been used to 
challenge lender's mortgage decision-making. 13 
An analysis of disparate impact as a legal theory begins with the rule set 
out in Griggs v. Duke Power. 134 Griggs challenged the use of a written 
employment test for hiring under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discriminatory employment practices. Ruling that intent was 
not necessary to establish discrimination in hiring practices, the Court 
determined that practices with a disparate impact must be justified by a 
b . . 135 C dl . .. d G· 136 I usmess necessIty. ommentators roun y cntIcIze nggs. n response 
to subsequent court rulings narrowing the conceEt, Congress codified the 
standard in the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments. I 7 
Fair lending'S disparate impact test, also known as the "effects test," is 
132. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FED. 
RESERVE BD., OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION & NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., INTERAGENCY 
FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES iv (2009), available at http://www.ffiee.gov/ 
PDF/fairlend.pdf. 
133. HUD recently adopted a disparate impact rulc-24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). The 
Consumer Financial Protection Board issucd statements regarding thcir intended usc of the 
disparate impact theory. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BULLETIN 2012-04 (Fair Lcnding) 
(Apr. 18,2010). 
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
135. Id. at 431-32. 
136. See Alfrcd W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective 
Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. I, 1-2,20-22 (1987); see generally Elaine W. Shoben, The 
Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
221, 221-23 (1983) ("The difference between 'intentional' and 'effect' discrimination still poses 
a question today in thc area of subjective intcrviews."). 
137. In Fcbruary 2013, HUD issued a final rule making the existing ECOA disparatc impact 
rule applicable to the FHA. In Junc 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Twp. of Mt. 
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, 133 S. Ct. 2824, 2824 (2013), to consider thc 
scope of disparate impact under the FHA, but the casc settled before oral argument. See 
generally Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis 
of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 
374, 403-08, 410 (2013), available at ht!p:lldigitalcommons.wel.american.edulcgi/viewcontent. 
egi?article=1906&eontext=aulr (questioning why the Supreme Court of the United States chose 
"to assess disparate impact theory in housing cases after allowing the theory to rest undisturbed 
for so many decades"). 
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found in Regulation B.138 In litigation, plaintiffs use Title VII's burden-
shifting standard, which is similar to the test in Griggs. To prove 
discriminatory effects, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of 
disparate impact. The burden then shifts to the defendant to justify its actions. 
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the existence of a less 
discriminatory alternative. 139 This method of proof is the same proof as Title 
VII employment discrimination actions. 140 That is, they defer to the 
defendant's justifications. 141 What has become apparent is that the defendant's 
justifications regarding mortgage-lending decisions are made even more 
complicated by this country's residential segregation and racial income 
disparities. Thus, the lenders' justification of its policies and practices must be 
viewed through the prism of race. 
B. Discretion and Vagueness in Fair Lending 
Plaintiffs relying on the disparate impact theory must show: 1) a specific 
policy or practice, 2) a disparate impact, and 3) facts raising a sufficient 
inference of causation. 142 Recent developments in employment law regarding 
the disparate impact theory may impede fair lending plaintiffs who are 
challenging a warehouse lender's practice of allowin~ individual loan officers 
or mortgage brokers to exercise discretion in pricing. 1 3 
1. Discretion as a Bar to Fair Lending Enforcement 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes l44 is a noteworthy decision regarding 
138. See generally Equal Credit Opportunity (Regulation B), 76 Fed. Reg. 79,422 (Dee. 21, 
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 (2011)) ("The legislative history of the Act indicates 
that the Congress intended an 'effects test' cone cpt, as outlined in the employment fic\d by the 
Supreme Court in ... Griggs v. Duke Power Co . ... to be applicab\c to a creditor's determination 
of creditworthiness."). 
139. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
140. Title VII requires a plaintiff to show that employer's stated reason for complainant's 
rejection was in fact a pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding 
modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)). 
141. The standard is difficult as well because it has changed over time. Before the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, the standard was "business necessity." 490 
U.S. 642 (1989). The defendant bore the burden of proving that no reasonable alternatives to the 
challenged practice were available. See Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 
1980). After Wards Cove, "business justification" standard places the burden of proving 
reasonable alternatives on the plaintiff. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. 
142. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988) (proving employment 
discrimination based on statistical evidence). 
143. After Waf-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, disaggregated discretionary decision-making 
may not be an acceptable way of proving racial disparities in lending based on HMDA data See 
Ropiequet, Assessing the Impact ofWal-Mart Stores, supra note 131, at 197. 
144. Waf-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2547. The complaint alleged that Wal-Mart 
discriminated against 1,500,000 current or former female employees in its 3,400 stores across the 
county with respect to pay and promotion decisions in violation of Title VII. Id. 
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disparate impact and discretion in employment discrimination. 145 One 
commentator describes the decision as a "tangled doctrinal web.,,146 
The issue of class certification became entwined with the merits of 
plaintiffs' evidentiary burden of proving employment discrimination. 147 
Plaintiffs alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination proffered as a basis 
for class certification evidence of statistical disparity and expert testimony on 
implicit bias. Specifically, as proof of gender discrimination plaintiffs 
aggregated national statistics for all Wal-Mart stores on female pay and 
promotions. The~ also presented expert testimony on a gender-biased 
corporate culture. 14 
145. Scholars studying thc Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes opinion scc its implications 
having a far-reaching cffcct on employment discrimination eases. Professor Judith Resnik 
discussed the case in light of the equality rights of litigants who otherwise would not have access 
to courts. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion. Wal-Mart 
v. Dukcs. and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 135-36, 153-54 (2011) (discussing 
aggregate techniques that mix substantive and procedural rights and criticizing the Court's 
decision as providing protection for the property rights of individuals from group-based litigation 
while limiting the equality rights of groups with common interests). Professor Suzette Malveaux 
viewed the Court's decisions as not just discouraging class actions but also ignoring the common 
employment practice of employers' delegating discretionary decision-making to supervisors as a 
way of escaping liability for disparate impact and disparate trcatment. Suzette M. Malveaux, 
How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 34, 44 
(2011) (arguing that the Court's ruling on class certification requirements for Title VII is 
significant on employment discrimination eases because employees have a more difficult time 
acting collectively to challenge systemic discrimination). Professor Melissa Hart characterized 
the decision as one with many theoretical and doctrinal flaws, including the decision's rejection 
of statistical modeling as indicative of employment discrimination. Melissa Hart, Working Group 
on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 455, 468-75 (2011) (arguing that the court's rejection of statistical 
modeling does not justify its conclusion that individuals should engage in remedial hcarings 
instead of bringing class actions, and it ignores thc modern workplace with its decentralized 
management structures and "highly subjective criteria for employee evaluation"). Professor 
Natalie Pedersen posited that the case drew the linkage between social psychology and the 
practices of the employer that possibly indicates bias in decision-making. Natalie Bucciarelli 
Pedersen, The Hazards of Dukes: The Substantive Consequences of a Procedural Decision, 44 U. 
ToL. L. REV. 123, 141 (2012) (discussing how Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes may have changed 
the social framework theory previously used in employment discrimination cases). See also 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Introduction: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 63 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANe 91, 93 ("Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. straddles the substance-procedure divide at nearly 
every turn."); Stephanie S. Silk, More Decentralization. Less Liability: The Future of Systemic 
Disparate Treatment Claims in the Wake ofWal-Mart v. Dukes, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 637,640 
(2013) ("the Court's opinion sheds light on the difficulty that disparate treatment claimants now 
face"); Jessica L. Martens, Thinking Outside the Big Box: Applying a Structural Theory of 
Discrimination to Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 51 WASHBURN LJ. 411, 413 (2012) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court's approaeh impeded the recovery of potential victims of workplace 
discrimination and that a structural approach to class certification would recognize gender 
stereotyping resulting in employment discrimination). 
146. Burch, supra note 145, at 93. 
147. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,2551-52 (2011). 
148. Id. at 2552. 
202 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y [Vol. XXIV:1 
The Court rejected as insufficient proof of discrimination the statistical 
evidence and the expert testimony.149 The Court characterized the evidence as 
"only evidence of a general policy of discrimination" and "worlds away" from 
meeting the "significant proof' standard. 15o Wal-Mart's corporate policy 
prohibited discrimination in employment decisions and allowed local 
managers' discretion to make promotions and increase pay.151 The Court 
determined that plaintiffs alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination 
under Title VII and seeking class certification are expected to identify a 
specific policy that shows a company procedure that has resulted in biased 
decision-making. 152 Absent that, plaintiffs must show that the company 
operated under a general policy of discrimination affecting all members of the 
class, which required strong inferences of discriminatory conduct at the 
regional and national level. 153 
The absence of an identifiable policy in the Wal-Mart case led the Court to 
conclude that the statistically significant differences in pay and promotion 
were not based on gender discrimination. 154 It was significant to the Court's 
ruling that the corporate policy was to give individual store managers 
discretion on pay and promotion issues, thus establishing the lack of a uniform 
policy.155 Because individual managers could make independent decisions 
under the policy, the corporate policy lacked the nexus required to establish 
causation for class certification. 156 
What the decision seems to overlook is that subjective decision-making is 
the root cause of unconscious and implicit bias in the workplace. How to 
ameliorate continued discrimination without taking into account the restrictive 
effects of stereotypes and implicit bias constrains the analysis. 15? The Dukes 
decision thus becomes germane to fair lending issues. The decision calls into 
question favorable decisions allowing fair lending class actions to proceed 
based on the disparate impact theory. 
In Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., plaintiffs challenged 
the discretion that wholesale lenders gave mortgage brokers to price mortgage 
loans. 15S African American and Hispanic borrowers alleged that GreenPoint 
charged disproportionately high interest rates and used statistical analysis to 
149. Jd. at 2555. 
150. Jd. at 2545. 
151. Jd. at 2554. 
152. Jd. at 2553. 
153. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,2553 (2011). 
154. The Court specifically rejected the plaintiffs' proffer ofa "social framcwork analysis" 
and regression analysis given the absence of a uniform corporate policy. Jd. at 2555. 
155. Jd. at 2554. 
156. Jd. at 2556. 
157. Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 
468-75 (2011). 
158. Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 627, 630 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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establish disparate impact. 159 Relying on the favorable Ninth Circuit decision 
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the court affirmed that for class certification purposes, 
the plaintiff's statistical analysis of the lender's discriminatory conduct did not 
have to prove that it would win on the merits of the case. 160 
Ramirez is a good illustration of how the warehouse lending operation 
works. GreenPoint originated nearly ninety-three percent of its mortgages 
through wholesale channels, relying on "tens of thousands of authorized 
brokers.,,161 After funding the mortgages, GreenPoint sold them into the 
secondary market where they were packaged into mortgage-backed 
securities. 162 
Plaintiffs' allegations regarding discriminatory lending related to 
GreenPoint's discretionary pncmg policy, which governed brokers' 
compensation for their services. "GreenPoint paid brokers a 'yield spread 
premium' or 'rebate' when they set the interest rate" above par, and allowed 
them to impose higher rates and fees at their discretion. 163 GreenPoint capped 
broker commission at five percent of the loan amount and monitored the fees 
for compliance with its policies. l64 Arguably GreenPoint's written guidelines 
and monitoring of the brokers' fees would satisfy the Dukes Court. Although 
the Dukes factual predicate is based on class action certification, the Court's 
dicta on the commonalit~ of claims is useful in understanding how to evaluate 
management discretion. 65 The Court clearly disfavored dispersed decision-
making within a corporation ad meeting the evidentiary standard for proving 
gender discrimination. 166 The absence of corporate directives, policies or 
guidelines on how managers and supervisors were to make promotion and 
159. Id. at 63l. 
160. Ramirez settled before the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes. See Order, No. 3:08-CV-0369-TEH (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12,2011). Cf Barrett v. H&R Block, 
No. 08-101 57-RWZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30713, at *18 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2011) (plaintiffs' 
expert's regression analysis are not grounds for denying class certification). The exercise of 
discretion by numerous loan officers was the basis for denying class certification in several cases. 
In these cases, the courts found there was no common mode of exercising discretion as required 
for class certification and thus denied the class action. See In re Wells Fargo Residential Mortg. 
Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-md-01930 MMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99830, at *18 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (stating that plaintiffs in Waf-Mart Stores had not shown that defendants 
"exercise[d] their discretion in a common way"); Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank, No. 08-2059, 
2011 WL 4018028, at *155 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8,2011) ("Plaintiffs would likely have to show the 
disparate impact and analysis for each loan officer or at a minimum each group of loan officers 
working for a specific supervisor."); In re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., No. 
08-MD-1974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118695, at *15 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 11,2011) (finding that 
plaintiffs' statistical analysis did not meet the commonality requirement required for class 
certification). 
161. Ramirez, 268 F.R.D. at 630. 
162. /d. 
163. Id. at 630-3l. 
164. Id. at 63l. 
165. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552. 
166. Id. at 2254-55. 
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wage decisions was critical. With no company guidance, no stated policy of 
non-discrimination and sole delegation to store management, the Dukes Court 
could not identify a uniform policy of discrimination that would justify the 
commonality necessary to support class claims of gender disparity in 
management.]6? However, unlike Dukes, in GreenPoint, the mortgage brokers 
were subject to a written policy, monitoring and review regarding compliance 
with that policy. The presence of an established policy on compensation and 
limits on third party discretion makes even a limited application of Dukes 
inapposite. 
The final element of a disparate impact claim is causation. Miller v. 
Countrywide Bank, N.A. provides a familiar defense often used to justify 
discrimination, in general. To support the use of discretionary pricing resulting 
in racial lending disparities, Countrywide justified the disparities in the 
. . k ]68 competItIve mar et. 
African-American borrowers alleged that under Countrywide'S 
discretionary pricing policy they were three times more likely than white 
borrowers to receive a high-interest loan.]69 The defense countered that the 
causation factor was not met because plaintiffs failed to show a correlation 
between the alleged disparities and how the discretionary pricing policy caused 
the disparity.]?O Rejecting this argument, the court found that the plaintiffs' 
proof was adequate because not only did Countrywide authorize both brokers 
and employers to engage in discretionary pricing, but also the plaintiff's 
complaint alleged Countrywide did so as policy and the complaint cites 
"reports observing that granting markup discretion to brokers and/or 
employees in other mortgage companies often leads to discriminatory 
results."]?] 
Countrywide put forth a "market forces" defense that implicitly 
acknowledges disparities. 172 Countrywide argued that the negotiated terms 
were the result of competitive market forces, and thus could not "yield to 
disparate impact analysis.,,]?3 The presumption underlying the argument is that 
the market self-corrects, therefore making the determined loan rates even, 
although the rates may be "higher than the par rate.,,]?4 Indeed, the court found 
that the supposed 'self-correction' was, in effect, a "practice" that amounts to a 
167. [d. at 2553. 
168. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257 (D. Mass. 2008). 
169. [d. at 253. 
170. ld. at 259. 
171. The court found that authorization from Countrywide sufficient to deny the motion to 
dismiss, while explicitly recognizing that it mayor may not meet the evidentiary burden of 
proving discriminatory lending practices at trial. [d. 
172. [d. at 257-58. 
173. [d. 
174. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, 571 F. Supp. 2d 251,257-58 (D. Mass. 2008). 
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policy and had become an effective way of discriminating. 175 
Miller would not survive a challenge to class certification under Dukes 
because the statistical analysis did not identify a common mode of exercising 
discretion. 176 But its "market defense" belies a corporate culture uninfected by 
racial stereotypes. What is problematic, and what law and policy must address, 
is how to check subjective decision-making in order to stop continued 
discrimination in lending. Lending, like employment, is susceptible to 
unconscious bias and subtle stereotyping. When that notion is unchecked, 
pricing disparities become acceptable, in spite of legal prohibitions. 
The pricing disparities revealed by the HMDA data provide a basis for 
challenging lending discrimination. However, the disparate impact's method 
of proof is fairly stringent, and requires more than just reliance on HMDA 
data. 177 As the discussion above indicates, the requirement of identifying a 
specific policy or practice is difficult when warehouse lenders use originating 
lenders. By allowing wide discretion among originating lenders, a court may 
find that there is no specific policy from the warehouse lender or a unified 
practice among the brokers and lenders. This discretionary void, as the Miller 
court indicates, insulates the decision-making. 178 Proof of disparate impact 
causation is complex. The expert testimony must present sufficient statistical 
proof and analysis to show common harm, characteristic terms, and frequency 
of incidence. Further, the discriminatory loan pricing must be linked to the 
pricing differentials and shown along racial lines. The plaintiff must show that 
the identified brokers and loan officers on a sustained basis used race as a 
determinant. Even with this burden met, the defense is allowed to show a 
business justification for the decisions. The question becomes when deference 
to the lender's justification is appropriate. 
2. The Flawed Legitimate Business Rationale 
The complexity of race and segregated housing patterns, fueled by 
government policies and practices, intersect with the legitimacy of racial 
disparities in lending. 179 Recognizing private market concerns and the 
potential for regulatory intervention to restrict markets must be balanced, 
however, with structural discrimination in lending. 
HMDA, with its public information disclosure requirements, incentivizes 
lenders to consider whether they are making loans in a racially biased way. 
Similarly, it requires them to consider how to mitigate disparate impact 
175. Id. at 258. 
176. Wa1-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,2554 (2011). 
177. John L. Ropiequet & Christopher Navcja, A Curious Dichotomy: Fair Lending 
Litigation and Enforcement Actions Following Wa1-Mart Storcs, Inc. v. Dukes, 32 BANKING & 
FIN. SERVS. POL'y REP. 1,2 (2013). 
178. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251,255-56 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988». 
179. See discussion infra at Part IV, A. 4. 
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through examination and evaluation of alternatives. Yet, in the fair lending 
context, there is an unintended limitation to disparate impact's business 
justification. An individual lending decision intersects with private decision-
making, law, and government policy. This results from the complexity 
associated with its numerous variables and qualifiers, market segments, 
origination sources, and the geographic location of the property. 
The traditional disparate impact analysis is concerned primarily with 
proving fairness and negating arbitrary, subjective decision-making. There 
also must be concern about the way in which lending policies exacerbate racial 
inequality in communities. The high incidence of subprime lending in 
minority neighborhoods resulted in massive foreclosures. The foreclosures 
prompted the regulatory enforcement actions discussed above to correct the 
racial disparities in lending. 18o Moreover, there are limits on the business 
justification test that the Griggs burden-shifting test alone cannot ameliorate. 181 
Disparate impact's burden shifting may be limited to underscoring the 
disparity-producing action, e.g., discouraging the adoption of a lending policy 
that relates only to minority borrowers. Indeed, the limits of the fair lending 
disparate impact regime are shown when it is unable to circumvent the 
structural practices and embedded racial inequalities. 
Eliminating discriminatory mortgage practices requires exammmg more 
closely the operation of the modem mortgage markets. 182 Today's mortgage 
finance transaction has many stages ripe with opportunities to treat 
unsuspecting borrowers unfairly. How a court evaluates the business 
justification the lender offers is critical to enforcement of fair lending laws. 
Using the business justification under the disparate impact analysis should be 
viewed as a discretion-constraining rule. 183 Business justification was not 
intended to be a specific rule regarding conduct. 184 Indeed, a more specific 
disparate impact rule will not limit originating lenders' discretion. The 
disparate impact rule is needed to require lenders, and others subject to Title 
VII, to evaluate policies and decision-making for unintended consequences 
resulting in racial bias. The discretion-constraining effect of disparate impact, 
180. See discussion supra at Part II, B. 2. 
181. Olatunde c.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 396 (2007). 
182. Thc modcrn mortgage market involves numerous loan products, different loan 
channels, and the originate-to-distribute model of mortgage financing. REN S. ESSENE & 
WILLIAM C. ApGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING 
MORTGAGE MARKET BEHA VIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS I 
(2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.eduisites/jehs.harvard.eduifiles/mm07I_mortgage_ 
market_ behavior.pdf. 
183. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177-79 
(1989) (discussing federalism and arguing that judicial opinions should cstablish broad 
discretion-constraining rules of law). 
184. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971) ("Thc Act proscribes not 
only overt discrimination but also practices that arc fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation."). 
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however, depends on identifying the limits of, in this case, the ongmating 
lenders' options. Those limits could be placed appropriately on the scope of 
activities that may be discriminatory by imposing specific rules. 
Another option is to constrain the discretion or the authority of managers 
to under-enforce the rules. To have a rule of business justification that that 
ignores how managers are able to skirt the applicability of the fair lending rules 
limits the use of the rule. An absence of limits on what constitutes a viable 
defense in the fair lending context results in both discriminatory conduct and 
supra-competitive profits. This is an absolute disregard for this rule of law. 
Disparate impact is an ineffective theory if it does not constraint this 
delegation of discretion. There should be limits on what conduct lenders may 
legally undertake to practice fair lending. Similarly, what business 
justification requires lenders to take into account should be defined. 
Otherwise, disparate impact as applied to fair lending only constrains the 
rationale that supports a lender's discretion, not the degree of discretion they 
can exercise. 
IV. REFORM AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
According to the foregoing analysis, warehouse lenders are able to 
delegate limitless discretion through originating lenders to use warehouse loans 
in a discriminatory manner. HMDA's monitoring functions are inadequate to 
deter these actions. This delegation, embedded within the funding process, 
essentially absolves the warehouse lender of the duty to avoid discrimination. 
The duty to not discriminate should be non-delegable. Allowing warehouse 
lenders to "tum a blind eye" negates the fair lending laws. Section A considers 
some strategies regulators might employ to both monitor the warehouse 
lender's duty and reduce the discretion that the warehouse lender delegates to 
the originating lender. Section B considers the societal policy mandates and 
social norms that support implementing these reforms. 
There are three limitations to these suggestions. First, these suggestions, 
based on the considerations discussed above, do not propose an exclusive, or 
even singular approach to limit warehouse lenders' delegation of the fair 
lending duty or originating lender's discretion. Instead, it is my objective to 
identify integral ways that HMDA can effectively monitor discrimination in 
real-time and lead to the design of better monitoring measures. Second, this 
discussion is neither an effort to engage directly in the ongoing debate about 
the role of the sub-prime credit in either the private or public capital markets. 
It also is not an effort to value or oppose the prominence of short-term funding, 
such as warehouse lending, or of securitization in the mortgage finance market. 
Finally, the suggested reforms are not an attempt to explicitly or implicitly 
decide who bears responsibility for the financial crisis. 185 Difficult questions 
185. See generally U.S. FIN. INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REpORT 
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remain about how the public and private capital markets that fund the housing 
market were and should be regulated. 186 My purpose is fairly narrow and 
limited to the accepted notion that Congress enacted HMDA to monitor 
discriminatory lending in both its original and contemporary versions and that 
constraining originating lender discretion within acceptable limits is within the 
statute's regulatory scope. 
A. Reforms 
1. Fair Lending and Warehouse Lending Incentives 
Left unaddressed in Dodd-Frank was the relationship between fair lending 
and warehouse funding. As discussed above, Dodd-Frank restrains lender 
discretion by generally reforming origination standards and qualified 
mortgages. But, it fails to identify other reforms that are needed to create an 
affordable, inclusive housing finance market. 187 Understanding how 
warehouse lending can incentivize fair lending is critical. The crux of any 
reform lays in evaluating what role warehouse lenders must play in fair lending 
. k 188 ns management. 
Fair lending laws are concerned with the discrimination in which private 
lenders engage, and the disparities that result. In the regulatory context, laws 
can have both a prohibitive and a deterrent effect. 189 HMDA, as a statutory 
complement to CRA, is a deterrent statute. 190 Because it is meant to deter, its 
objective is distinguishable from the fault-based concept of intentional 
discrimination. 191 Instead, HMDA encourages private decision-making by 
(20 II), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.eduiarchive/fcic/2011031 0173545Ihttp://cOI82732. 
cdn l.c1oudfilcs.rackspacec1oud.com/fcic _final_report Jul1.pdf (discussing The Financial Inquiry 
Commission which is taskcd with the responsibility of delving into and uncovering the myriad 
causcs of the 2008 financial crisis and making recommendations for future policy). 
186. See generally David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal 
Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907 (2010). 
187. Brian Honea, GSE Reform Not Expected In the Near Term, DS NEWS (Aug. 12,2014), 
http://dsnews.com!news/08-12-20 14/gse-reform-expected-Ieast-20 16 (discussing several 
proposals to reform the secondary housing market finance system and the-now bankrupt-
government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and discussing how many 
commentators do not cxpect any reform before 2015 or 2016.) 
188. Megan Haberle, Finishing What Dodd-Frank started: Why Housing Finance Reform 
Still Matters, AL TERNET (June 30, 20 II, 10:38 AM), http://www.aiternet.org/speakeasy/ 
20 I 1/06/301 fi n i shi ng-what -dodd-frank -startcd -why-housing -fi nance-reform -sti 11-matters?page= 
entire%2CO. 
189. Regulatcd entities must comply with administrativc rules or face sanctions for failing 
to do so. See generally Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating By Incentives: Myths, Models, and 
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 600-604 (2002) (suggesting tailored cnvironmental 
regulation as a "supplement" to direct regulation or incentive-based regulation). 
190. See discussion supra in text surrounding notes 51-52. 
191. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15,2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (discussing how disparate impact 
in fair lending is often criticized for its lack of explicit regulatory guidelines and HUD recently 
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giving more attention to reporting, which may include racial disparities, with 
the purpose of limiting racial inequality in mortgage lending. In this regard, 
HMDA can incentivize lenders to change their practices if they result in 
mortgage discrimination. HMDA is also typical of conduct deterring standards 
because its remedies are enforced at the administrative level only.192 Thus, 
changes to HMDA will make it particularly well suited to address structural 
discrimination in lending. A focused inquiry, therefore, becomes how HMDA 
can more effectively discourage disparate impact in mortgage lending, and 
thereby encourage private lenders to address racial disparities. 
The broad scope of disparate impact in fair lending makes its application 
troubling for the courts. Plaintiffs are often unable to establish that the lender 
had a policy that supports a particular pattern of discriminatory lending. 193 
Lenders, in tum, have supposedly adopted policies that encourage fair lending 
without specifically identifying what the policy encompasses or what practices 
are employed. Yet, the immediate goal of HMDA is to encourage private 
lenders to address the complexity of racial inequality that exists in lending. It 
is difficult for most lenders to adopt a mechanism for monitoring disparate 
impact when they claim that either there is not a discrete policy capable of 
producing the disparity or that failure to implement the policy at issue caused 
significant competitive disadvantage. 194 
Moreover, a more robust and uniform regulatory approach uses disparate 
impact as its foundation. Consistent with HMDA's objectives, the regulations 
should affirmatively require that all lenders, including warehouse lenders, take 
steps to reduce the lending disparities within their own portfolios when making 
lending decisions. In this way, HMDA becomes a mechanism that does more 
than simply prompt questions about what an institution's actual performance in 
implemented disparate impact regulations outlining burden of proof required.). 
192. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (200 I) (indicating private right of action is 
not available to enforce Title VI's effects regulation). 
193. Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (D. Md. 2010) 
(alleging that Wells Fargo's predatory and discriminatory lending practices led to foreclosures 
that harmed the City. Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the City's standing and 
contending that its complaint failed to state a cognizable FHA violation under either a disparate 
treatment or disparate impact theory. The Motion to Dismiss was granted, but allowed an 
opportunity for the City to file a second amended complaint.). 
194. See, e.g., Noland v. Commerce Mortg. Corp., 122 F.3d 551, 553 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(describing bank's decision to reject borrower's loan application because the borrower did not 
have cash needed for closing upheld); see also Rowe v. Union Planters Bank of Se. Missouri, 289 
F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2002) (dcscribing lender's business justification upheld because plaintiff 
did not qualify for either loans applied for- FmHA-guarantecd or a commercial loan); see also 
Boykin v. Bank of Am. Corp., 162 F. App'x 837, 840 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) (describing how a lender's 
business justification was upheld because loan was "high cost" under New York law and 
prohibited under bank's written policies). Individual trial judges have found the disparate impact 
theory a viable approach in several class action mortgage discrimination cases. The cases have 
all scttled before the dcfendant-Ienders could use a competitivc disadvantage as a business 
justification. Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren. Discretionary Pricing. Mortgage 
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act. 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375,423 (2010). 
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mortgage lending is; it will also direct all lending segments to identify which 
policies and practices justifiably perpetuate racial inequities. It is time to 
acknowledge explicitly that HMDA seeks to eradicate racial bias and requires 
lenders to not simply adopt and implement a policy of non-discrimination, but 
to also to identify ways in which implicit bias can be countered. In this way, 
lenders become obligated to understand how racial disparity is generated in 
mortgage lending system and then develop appropriate remedies. 
2. Fair Lending Risk Management 
The warehouse lending settlements provide a strong expectation of what 
should be done to assess risk exposure and to control and monitor fair lending 
price risk.195 Effective fair lending management requires reducing disparities 
at every step in the lending process. As discussed above, the new rules of 
Dodd-Frank will help to curb lending abuse and provide more protection for 
consumers. The Dodd-Frank changes, however, do not eliminate the risk of 
unfair lending in discretionary pricing or the duty to monitor discriminatory 
pricing. Consistent with this duty, the warehouse lender should require 
appropriate disciplinary actions for non-compliance. 196 
Statistical analysis of the risk of unfair lending will allow lenders to ferret 
out the unintended differences in lending outcomes among demographic 
groups. Monitoring can also lead to early corrective actions. This duty is 
consistent with the responsibility that all lenders have to reduce the potential 
for fair lending issues. Warehouse lenders are in a unique position to exercise 
leverage over third party mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers and 
correspondent lenders that they fund. By requiring warehouse lenders to 
monitor the third parties with whom they deal, warehouse lenders can prohibit 
the third party's discriminatory conduct. It will require that all lenders 
proactively develop policy rules and decision criteria that correlate with race, 
ethnicity, gender, or other prohibited bases. Moreover, warehouse lenders are 
the only parties that have relevant information regarding all borrowers. Only 
they can evaluate differences in outcomes among borrowers who have similar 
credit characteristics. It is appropriate that lenders throughout the process 
maintain that duty. In so doing, lenders are solely exercising the due diligence 
h · . I f I d' 197 t at IS an mtegra part 0 any en mg process. 
195. See Plaza Home Consent Order, supra note 125. 
196. By using the reforms proposed, warehouse lenders should be able to determine whieh 
broker or correspondent lender is driving the disparities and take appropriate steps, whieh might 
include counseling, mandating fair lending training, capping compensation, or ceasing to do 
business together. Melanie Hibbs Brody & Richard R. Pace, Managing Fair Lending Risk in 
Wholesale Mortgage Pricing, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE, Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 1, 10, available at 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publieation/Oda 7f98f-3dfS-4682-bbb9-14d7 56617915/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachmentlbd4ed574-cOd8-449b-b 1 fd-19744feb7e2fIWholesalePricing_ WhitePaper. 
pdf. 
197. See generally Marsha J. Courchane & David Skanderson, Fair Lending Risk 
Management Lessons from Recent Settlements, CRA INSIGHTS: FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, Nov. 
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Given the changed lending environment, a more effective HMDA 
requirement would be to explicitly require warehouse lenders to monitor 
warehouse loans. 198 A contractual provision in the funding agreement between 
the warehouse lender and the originating lender would require the originating 
lender to certify that she is subject to the monitoring program. The provision 
should also give the warehouse lender the sole discretion to terminate the 
funding arrangement with the originating lender if the originating lender 
violates the policy.199 Monitoring wholesale prices, albeit complicated, speaks 
to the crux of lending pricing disparities. While some may argue that 
wholesale lenders are not liable for broker and correspondent pricing, it is 
difficult to prevent the third party conduct that may lead to pricing disparities 
without requiring the nexus between the warehouse lender and the third 
party.200 As the source of the funding, warehouse lenders are in a unique and 
critical position to exercise leverage over discretionary pricing decisions and 
incentivize the brokers and correspondents that they fund. 201 Additionally, 
they are in the best position to control, manage, and monitor pricing discretion 
regarding product offerings and pricing outcomes. What is imperative is that 
there is documentation for the business rationale for discretionary pricing 
adjustments and corrective action taken as necessary. 
Warehouse lenders should design specific policies and procedures to avoid 
discrimination, such as defined standards for discretionary pricing, pre-funding 
review that loans comply with these policies, and a prohibition on funding 
loans that do not comply. Warehouse lenders should require brokers to 
observe these standards. Furthermore, warehouse lenders should be required 
to have statistical monitoring programs for lending disparities in order to 
2012, available at http://www.crai.com/up loadedF iles/Publications/FE-Insights-Fair-Lending-
Risk-Management-1112.pdf. 
198. See Brody & Pace, supra note 196, at 3. 
199. Settlement Agreement and Order Thereon, United States v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 
No. 96-6159 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/ert/aboutlhce/ 
documents/longbeachsettle.php. The bank operated in what the lending industry calls the "B/C" 
credit market, which is subprime because borrowcrs have impaired credit and pay higher prices to 
compensate for increased risk to the lender. ld The parties agreed that to avoid costly litigation, 
the controversy should be resolved voluntarily. Jd. Both parties agreed that Long Beach Bank, 
its officials, employees, agents, as well as successors, will not engage in any act or practice that 
discriminates on the basis of age, scx, race or national origin in the pricing of mortgage loans as 
prohibited by the FHA and the ECOA. Jd. The agreement required Long Beach Bank to 
implement personnel training, accurate risk classifications, a retail mortgage loan monitoring 
system, and a consumer education program. ld 
200. See generally Brody & Pace, supra note 196. 
20 I. Thc Dodd-Frank Act placed limits on loan origination fees, which has changed the 
funding relationships, making many mortgage brokers "mini-correspondents" in order to avoid 
the statutory restrictions on fees that mortgage brokers can cam. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT., 4810-AM-P, POLICY GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY AND ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
RELEVANT TO MORTGAGE BROKERS TRANSITIONING TO MINI-CORRESPONDENT LENDERS I 
(2014), available at http://files.consumcrfinance.gov/fI201407_cfPb_guidance _ mini-correspon 
dcnt-lenders.pdf. 
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identify the causes of the disparities.202 In this way, the warehouse lender can 
develop "demographically-neutral loan prices" for each loan that can be 
compared for "similarly situated" borrowers, and, as necessary, take corrective 
action such as cutting funds to the particular broker or correspondent that fails 
to comply. The lender can also take appropriate action against the originating 
lender, whether that be withdrawing the line of credit or terminating the 
relationship with the offending party. 
3. HMDA Reform and Existing Fair Lending Law 
Finally, a regulatory-enforced disparate impact rule for warehouse lenders 
addresses the concerns that courts recognize already limit fair lending 
enforcement. First, the suggested reform is consistent with Dukes. Dukes 
requires a specific policy and practice as a predicate for a disparate impact 
case.203 It is both an old and wrong-headed notion that a failure to address 
where and how bias may enter into decision-making should absolve the 
decision-maker. While the Dukes Court may have been correct in not granting 
class certification based on lack of commonality, the underlying rule that 
allows lenders to circumvent judicial scrutiny should be shored up. Lenders 
cannot be allowed to develop a "safe harbor" by having rules or criteria 
available for regulatory evaluation that are protective of their intent to not 
comply with the recognized rules. Such a practice in and of itself is a violation 
of the spirit of the law. 
Implementing fair lending should involve all parties who share in the 
profitable enterprise of funding home mortgages. This change is necessary to 
further accountability. The proposed reform requires a specific policy and 
practice be put in place rather than continuing to protect the void of 
discretionary decision-making that can make disparate impact claims non-
actionable. It is consistent with HMDA's objective of providing a valid, 
reasonable measure for detecting discriminatory conduct. It also mitigates 
racial impacts through examination and evaluation of alternatives. The 
objective is to hold all lenders in the mortgage funding process accountable for 
fair lending decision-making. Concomitantly, all consumers should receive an 
affordable, sustainable mortgage loan. 
Second, the reform is also consistent with the court's findings in Ramirez 
regarding the use of statistical analysis to prove disparate impact. In Ramirez, 
the statistical analysis provides a factual basis for class commonality-
202. This requirement would be similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
recently adopted regarding third party issued credit ratings of asset-backed securities. The SEC 
regulation requires a credit rating agency to exercise internal controls over the ratings process, 
transparency of ccrtain ratings performance, and a requirement for third partics retained for the 
purpose of conducting due diligcnce related to asset-backed securities to provide a ccrtification 
containing specified information. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-10 (effcctive Nov. 14,2014). 
203. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, (2011) (stating Title VII liability 
under a disparate-impact theory requires thc plaintiff first identify the specific employmcnt 
practice that is challenged). 
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determining whether there are common characteristics and claims among the 
class of plaintiffs. Requiring the warehouse lender to present a statistical 
analysis would be very similar. A statistical analysis of the mortgages that the 
warehouse lender funds begins to answer the question of whether there is 
discrimination in lending. The warehouse lender determines the underwriting 
criteria for borrowers. The statistical analysis will determine whether its 
criteria and policies resulted in a disparate impact on minority borrowers or in 
minority neighborhoods. As with other data collected under HMDA, the 
warehouse lender's loan data would not be determinative of whether there is 
discrimination. What the data does is provide a basis for regulators to study 
and assess whether there are areas of concern. 204 
Lenders who make risk-based loans either predominately to minority 
borrowers or in minority neighborhoods should have to justify their practices 
in comparison to other lenders in the same area?05 Instead of simply asserting 
that the borrower's creditworthiness justifies a higher interest rate, lenders 
must identify and document how the loan is consistent with other loans in the 
same area. File review, data mining, and statistical regression modeling 
provide adequate analysis to determine whether product placement is fair. 
This also provides a rationale by which the court can measure the lender's 
decision-making and the profitability of the loan to determine if it is reasonable 
or exorbitant. 
As argued above, HMDA is not an indicator of lending discrimination, but 
204. For example, if the warehouse lender makes similar loans to all minority borrowers or 
all borrowers in a majority-minority neighborhood, the statistical analysis should triggcr further 
review. The additional revicw should compare the underwriting criteria, e,g, credit scores, debt to 
income ratio, etc., to assess similarity among borrowers and then compare the lender's profits 
with comparablc loans by other lcnders. This would be a check on the discretion of originating 
and warehouse lenders. Onc study has suggested that a measure of whether banks arc providing a 
fair share of mortgage loans to communities of color is whether the home purchasc and loan 
finance portfolio to reflect the regional distribution of homeowners and the actual mix of 
household income in each neighborhood. For example in the Twin Cities area of Minnesota, a 
lender that had a high concentration of subprime loans during the subprime crisis now has a 
disproportionately low rate ofprimc loans in the same area. See iNST. OF METRO. OPPORTUNITY, 
UNIV. OF MINN. SCH. OF LAW, TWIN CITIES IN CRISIS: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF COMMUNITIES 
OF COLOR IN MORTGAGE LENDING 10 (2014), available at http://www.law.umn.cdu/uploads/ 
cflbe/efbeOb8fda7508c925b74c7add57I f411iMO-Twin-Cities-Lending-Report-20 14-Final.pdf. A 
comparative analysis such as this uses the community'S actual demographics as a basis for a fair 
lending evaluation. This method could have a significant deterrent effect on discriminatory 
lending because lenders have access to the demographic information and are able to readily 
project the calculate whether a lender lending decision would be in compliance. 
205. See Sewin Chan, Michael Gedal, Vicki Been & Andrew Haughwout, The Role of 
Neighborhood Characteristics in Mortgage Default Risk: Evidence from New York City 15 
(Furman Ctf. for Real Estate and Urban Policy, Working Paper, 2011), available at 
http://furmancentef.org/files/publ icationslPathways _1_ Newest_with _Figures _ Working_Paper. pdf 
(concluding that for borrowers in census tracts that arc over 80 percent black, "the default hazard 
is ovcr 25 percent higher than that of borrowers in tracts with fewer than 20 percent black 
residents .... "). 
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is an indicator of the need for additional investigation. HMDA data can 
provide an "external view" to show whether there are observed pricing 
disparities that are either adverse to a protected class, are statistically 
significant, or are relatively large in magnitude?06 
Specifically, to reduce pricing disparities, warehouse lenders should 
monitor for comparison and compliance and report on two components of the 
borrower's loan package: the APR, and total broker fees. 207 Lenders should 
conduct periodic statistical monitoring?08 
A fundamental issue relates to how federal courts should scrutinize the 
lender's legitimate business rationale. Originating lenders defend the higher 
interest rates given to minority borrowers based on either creditworthiness or 
the geographic location of the property. What those same lenders, who are 
charged with discriminatory conduct, are not required to do is to prove that 
they have received a reasonable, rather than exorbitant profit margin?09 
Similarly, they are not required to demonstrate or report the statistical 
frequency of risk-based pricing in a geographical location. Why pricing 
concessions are required and the frequency with which they occur should be 
evaluated in comparison to competitors. Only by requiring such data in 
response to the legitimate business justification defense can a court adequately 
evaluate whether the limits on the originating lender's discretion are 
reasonable or in effect an excuse for discriminatory conduct.210 
Warehouse lenders' monitoring of the originating lender will also reduce 
its exposure to liability for the conduct of the originating lender who is its 
borrower. Similarly, warehouse lenders should want to insulate themselves 
from poor and discriminatory decision-making by an originating lender. By 
failing to monitor the loan fund disbursements, the warehouse lender is 
essentially delegating its duty to make loans that are not discriminatory. The 
originating lender then becomes the warehouse lender's agent, implicitly or 
explicitly, and the warehouse lender is then liable for its conduct. 
206. Brody & Pace, supra notc 196, at 3. 
207. Id. at 4-5. The APR "capturcs thc effect of discrctionary lendcr-bascd pncmg 
differences - such as price exceptions, lender fce waivcrs, etc." Id. at 5. The total broker fees 
capture the additional fees that borrowers pay up front. Id. at 4. Dodd-Frank reduced the amount 
of total fees that mortgage brokers can rcceive and e1iminatcd yield sprcad premiums, a common 
way that brokers added to the cost ofa loan. 12 U.S.c. § 1403 (amending section 129B ofthc 
Truth in Lending Act (as added by section 1402(a)). 
208. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES 
SECTION 3.2-1 LOANS 47 (2005) ("A lending policy should not be a static documcnt, but must bc 
reviewcd in a light of changing circumstances surrounding thc borrowing needs of the bank's 
customers as wcll as changes that may occur within the bank itself."). 
209. See Cassandra Jones Havard, "On the Take ": The Black Box of Credit Scoring and 
Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 241,247 (2011). 
210. Courchane & Skandcrson, supra note 197, at I, 5 (suggesting that if a significant 
number of loans need pricing concessions, it may indicate a nced to adjusting ratc sheet pricing to 
eliminate discretionary pricing). 
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The warehouse lender's regression analysis and disparity pricing studies 
should have a qualified privilege because it provides regulators with needed 
information to assess fair lending compliance.211 Additionally, regulators 
should be granted some discretion in declaring penalties, as long as violations 
are within a specified range of default. 
Finally, as the Miller court posited, fair lending laws are a response to 
markets that cannot self-correct or stop discrimination.212 What is needed is 
both an effective market and regulatory response to the originating lenders' 
exercise of discretion in pricing. This discretion is a product of markets that do 
not self-correct. The present structure of the housing finance market allows 
originating lenders to select the appropriate loan product and loan channel for 
the buyer. Constraints on lender discretion could involve limitations of 
lenders' choices in making these decisions.213 Alternatively, originating 
lenders can be constrained by defining the warehouse lender's regulatory 
obligations in a way that requires more stringent enforcement by regulators and 
the courtS?14 
This approach is justified not only because markets are not self-correcting, 
but also because failure to do so reinforces the public perception that this 
lending discrimination is private, harmless decision-making. The public is 
largely indifferent to fair lending, assessing violations as based on individual 
choice, while regulators are unaccountable for under-enforcement due to the 
invisibility of non-enforcement. The public indifference towards what appears 
to be the private, harmless decision-making provides no incentive for the 
lender to reform outside of the regulatory structure. Conversely, lenders have 
strong incentives to exploit non-compliance with fair lending laws in ways that 
actually disguise the conduct that justifies regulatory enforcement. 
Implementing any of the foregoing strategies requires balancing the 
interests of lenders and consumers. If our nation is to protect the fair lending 
values that the Title VII reflects, and upon which the disparate impact doctrine 
is premised, there must constraints on delegation of pricing discretion. This 
limitation is integral to ensuring that creditworthy borrowers have access to 
sustainable, affordable homeownership.215 
211. Currently there is a qualified privilege for producing such data. If a creditor conducts 
or authorizes a voluntary self-test, the data is privileged if the creditor has also taken appropriate 
corrective action. See 12 C.F .R. § 1002.15. 
212. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (D. Mass. 2008). 
213. This addresses and may even eliminate steering: deliberately, intentionally, making 
predatory loans that violate fair lending standards because it is difficult to assess as such and 
significantly under-enforced. . 
214. See Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for 
Assessing When Disparate Impacts are Unjustified, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 700 (2007). 
215. See KOCHHAR, FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 5 (finding that Latinos lost an 
estimated two-thirds of their net worth and Asian and African American wealth has fallen by 
more than half due to the economic recession in the U.S). 
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4. The Policy Implications 
Home ownership is the cornerstone of the American Dream,z16 It 
represents opportunity, prosperity and a better future for the "next generation." 
Home ownership has always been tied to other rights.217 It also provides 
financial and social benefits. In addition to the tax deduction for property 
taxes and mortgage interest payments, the house appreciates in value and 
becomes a source of collateral for borrowing.218 Home ownership makes the 
homeowner vested in the neighborhood and its surroundings,z19 There are also 
spillover effects, which include impacts on children, security of neiWhborhoods 
and improved social services that benefit communities as a whole.22 
There are also spillover effects when home ownership ceases. Such was 
the case with the subprime crisis. The 2007 financial crisis combined risky 
loans, weak underwriting - sometimes even based on fraudulent information, 
the securitization of loans on the secondary markets, and a lax regulatory 
environment.221 Many groups played a part in this, including borrowers who 
did not understand loan products, investors who placed heavy reliance on 
appraisals and ratings, and mortgage originators who added exorbitant fees and 
costs to borrowers' loans.222 Each of these groups presents complex conflicts 
of interest and requires collective action to resolve the economic consequences. 
There are also particular challenges and spillover effects that require policy 
intervention to mediate. For example, there is the occurrence of negative 
equity, which leaves many homeowners "underwater," or owing more on a 
home than it is worth.223 Homeowners in need of loan modifications found 
216. Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrcy L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage 
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 433 (2010) 
("mortgage lending has always been the gateway to the American Dream of homeowners hip."). 
217. Historically, property ownership gave citizens the right to vote. See generally, Glenn 
P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote: Better Results From The Voting 
Rights Act?, 199674 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (1996). 
218. TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM -
SECURITIZA nON AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 433 (2009). 
219. See generally Joseph M. Harkness and Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership 
on Children: The Role of Neighborhood Characteristics and Family Income, FED. RES. BANK OF 
NEW YORK ECON. POL'y REV. (June 2003) (an increase in property also increases home 
ownership); William M. Rohe, Leslie, S. Stewart, Home Ownership and Neighborhood Stability, 
7 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 37 (1996) (study concluding that home ownership has beneficial 
effects on children, and thereby on society). 
220. Donald R. Haurin, Toby L. Parccl & R. Jean Haurin, The Impact of Homeownership 
on Child Outcomes 15 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. L1HO-
01.14, 200 I), available at hup:llwww.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.cdu/fi\cs/lih00 1-14.pdf. 
221. Christopher L. Petcrson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
22\3-24 (2007) (discussing how the secondary market fundcd prcdatory loans). 
222. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FED. BANKING L. REp. " 97-488 (CCH) (Jan. 27, 
2011). 
223. 9.1 Million u.s. Residential Properties Seriously Underwater in First Quarter, Lowest 
Level in Two Years, REALTY TRAC (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/contenti 
foreclosure-market-rcportlq 1-20 14-home-cquity-and-undcrwater-report-803 7. RealtyTrac began 
reporting the number of properties underwater or the negative equity in homes in 2012. The U.S. 
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negotiating difficult because their interests were not aligned with those of 
investors who had an expected rate of return.224 The health of the financial 
system and the economic toll for American families presents challenges as 
we 1 1.225 
The economic toll on American families is arguably the most damaging 
spillover effect. One way to measure this effect is by the number of homes 
foreclosed.226 As a consequence of the subprime crisis, between 2004 and 
2008, 2.7 million homes were foreclosed.227 For each home foreclosed in a 
neighborhood, the surrounding homes reduced in value an average of 
$5,000.228 This loss was greater in low-income neighborhoods.229 
Additional16, the wealth of families and communities of color was significantly impacted?3 Home ownership rates for blacks and HispaniclLatino families 
dropped to a range of forty to forty-two percent.231 This represented a return to 
the home ownership rates of fifteen years ago?32 The foreclosures following 
the subprime crisis also pointed out another flaw in the American 
homeownership model. Most of the foreclosures occurred in socially and 
Home Equity & Underwater Report reports on property where the combined loan amount secured 
by the property is at least 25 percent higher than the property's estimated market value. During 
the second quarter of 2012, negative equity affected 12.8 million U.S. residential properties 
representing 29 percent of all properties with a mortgage. In the first quartcr of 2013, 10.9 
million residential properties representing 26 percent of all properties with a mortgage were 
seriously underwater. In the fourth quarter of 2013, 9.3 million residential properties representing 
19 percent of all properties with a mortgage were seriously underwater. Id. For the first quarter of 
2014, 9.1 million U.S. residential properties were seriously underwater. Id. 
224. Bank of America's settlement with several state attorney generals ran into problems 
with those who invested in the allegedly predatory loans. The investors of Countrywide 
Financial, Bank of America's predecessor, protested Bank of America's home-loan-modification 
program as against their interests. Ruth Simon, Investors Hit BofA Loan Modifications, WALL 
ST. J., (Nov. 18, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/artic1es/SBI22696804303735525?mg=reno 
64-wsj. 
225. Amy J. Sepinwall, Justice, Rights, and Bailouts: Responsibility, Repair and 
Redistribution in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, II GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 301, 310-12 
(2013) (discussing the shared responsibility among Americans for the subprime crisis). 
226. Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Wei Li, Carolina Reid & Roberto G. Quercia, Lost 
Ground, 2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and Foreclosures, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, 14-30 (2011). 
227. Subprime Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202 Billion; 40.6 Million Homes 
Lose $5,000 on Average, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 4 (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www. 
responsiblelending.orglmortgage-Iendinglresearch-analysis/subprime-spillover.pdf [hereinafter 
Subprime Spillover]. 
228. Id. at 1. 
229. Id. 
230. KOCHHAR, FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 14. 
231. Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage 
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 381 (2010). 
232. JAMES H. CARR & KATRIN B. ANACKER, NAT'L COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
COALITION, THE STATE OF HOUSING IN BLACK AMERICA, 3 (2012), available at http://issuu. 
com/jhearr/does/state _ oChousingjn _black_america/I. 
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economically isolated and disinvested areas.233 Loans made by subprime 
lenders were not only unsustainable, but also increased segregation.234 Again, 
the failure of fair lending laws is evident in the manner in which home 
financing was provided. 
Ironically, the racial wealth gap is now greater than it was two decades ago 
and the laws implemented to give minorities more economic opportunities are 
skirted.235 The effect is that low-and moderate-income minorities may be 
more economically marginalized than they were when the laws that ensured 
fair access to credit were passed. Changes in the housing finance market that 
caused the securitization of loans to shift the risk of loss, explains why credit 
exploded in long-neglected minority neighborhoods.236 Lenders leveraged 
these short-term gains against minorities in a way that has decimated the 
wealth in communities of color.237 For law to not be responsive to this 
phenomenon both legally sanctions and worsens economic inequality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Will reforming HMDA reduce originating and warehouse lenders' 
discretion and thereby reinforce fair lending laws? Changing HMDA has the 
effect of making transparent, and therefore more consistent, the determination 
of whether a lender's risk-based lending violates the fair lending rules. Risk-
based pricing is difficult to monitor for discriminatory motives. The regulatory 
void created by the ineffective fair lending examinations makes the regulatory 
233. Subprime Spillover, supra note 227, at 4. 
234. CHRISTY ROGERS, SUBPRIME LOANS, FORECLOSURE, AND THE CREDIT CRISIS 12 
(2008). As a result of the Subprime Crisis, several major cities, ineluding Baltimore, Cleveland, 
Los Angeles, and Miami, brought lawsuits against lenders. Wells Fargo Settlement: A Predatory 
Lender Pays Up, BALT. SUN, July 15, 2012, available at http://artieles.baltimoresun.coml20 
12-07 -15/newslbs-cd-wclls-fargo-20 120715 _1_ subprime-mortgages-minority-borrowcrs-mortgag 
e-brokers; Henry J. Gomez, Federal Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Blaming Banks For Foreclosure 
Mess In Cleveland, PLAIN DEALER REP., May 19, 2009, available at http://www. 
cleveland.comlcityhall/index.ssf/2009/05/federalj udge _dismisses _ elevel.html; but see John 
Caniglia, Wells Fargo Settlement Could Pour Millions of Dollars Into Greater Cleveland, THE 
PLAIN DEALER, July 12,2012 (discussing the Justice Department settlement with Wells Fargo for 
discriminatory lending violations in Cleveland); Mariah Blake, Miami and Los Angeles Sue 
Banking Giants Over the Sub-Prime Mortgage Debacle, MOTHERJONES, Dec. 23, 2013, available 
at http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/20 13/ 12/cities-sue-banking-giants-over-sub-prime-mortgag 
e-debaele. 
235. CARR & ANACKER, supra notc 232, at 4. 
236. From its inception, HMDA data has been vital to showing patterns of lending in 
minority neighborhoods. Ira Goldstein & Dan Urevick-Ackelsberg, Subprime Lending, Mortgage 
Foreclosures And Race: How Far Have We Come And How Far Have We To Go? THE 
REINVESTMENT FUND, 2 (2008) (positing that early HMDA studies, though flawed showed that a 
lack of credit flow into neighborhoods in which the majority of the residents were of members of 
racial and ethnic minorities. 
237. Gary A. Dymski, Jesus Hernandez & Lisa Mohanty, Race, Power, and the 
Subprime/Foreclosure Crisis: A Mesoanalysis, in THE LEVY ECONOMIC INSTITUTE WORKING 
PAPER COLLECTION 31-32 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard ColI., Working Paper No. 669,2011). 
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arena an unrealistic check on lender's conduct when lending is motivated by 
race or other illegitimate factors. To the extent that loan originators believe 
that race and geographic location are predictive of creditworthiness, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the lenders will not act on their biased assumptions 
when there is no threat of accountability. To expect that court enforcement 
only through the disparate impact doctrine will control the problem is 
unfounded. 
This Article explored whether the relationship between HMDA, lender 
discretion, and fair lending enforcement is properly balanced. The regulatory 
enforcement scheme also vests a broad amount of discretion in the agencies 
and regulators charged with their enforcement. The recent discretionary 
pricing settlements bolster the conclusion that the present broad delegation of 
discretion leads to significant under-enforcement. If, however, all risk-based 
pricing becomes suspect and subject to unwarranted regulatory scrutiny, then 
amending HMDA would effectively drive risk-based lenders out of the market. 
Provided that a reformed HMDA does not create an automatic sanction, it will 
limit lender discretion by inviting more scrutiny of originating lenders whose 
conduct is clearly outside the norm. In addition, if changing HMDA 
scrutinizes decision-making more by lenders, it will also result in more self-
compliance among lenders and more pressure to enforce fair lending law. It 
also may also persuade regulators to more clearly recognize violations of the 
law. Requiring warehouse lenders to monitor loans by originating lenders is an 
effective way of ferreting out whether there is a disparate impact in lending. 
Monitoring also protects the warehouse lenders and places the onus on the 
originating lenders who are the parties actually responsible for determining 
how the loan funds are used. 
Completely restraining discretion and consequently shrinking the market 
could create market failure. Yet the regulatory scheme should be responsible 
for preserving the expectation of fairness in loan pricing that risk-based 
borrowers, indeed all borrowers, presume exists when they enter into a 
mortgage transaction. The predictable result is that lenders at every stage of 
the transaction will be more likely to comply with the fair lending laws in an 
informed, objective, rational, and non-discriminatory manner. Presently, the 
regulatory constraints are ineffective in stopping originating lenders from 
exercising unfettered discretion to set unreasonable high interest rates for risk-
based borrowers under the guise of probable borrower default. Warehouse 
lenders are complicit in discriminatory pricing discretion because they do not 
monitor the use of the mortgage funds that they provide to originating lenders. 
This Article suggests, in the context of HMDA, that monitoring needs to 
be put in place to reduce the degree of discretion delegated through risk-based 
pncmg. Even with recent reforms, risk-based pricing remains broadly 
discretionary. Effectively constraining discretion in risk-based pricing requires 
amending HMDA and then increasing enforcement of fair lending rules. The 
current regulatory response-allowing the market to discipline risk-based 
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lenders making risk-based loans-is fatally flawed. The strongest argument 
for the proposed amendment of HMDA is found in the legislative intent of the 
fair lending laws. Congress premised the fair lending laws on the artificial 
barriers that unjustly denied economic opportunities. Those artificial barriers 
still exist because that lenders use criteria and policies that disparately impact 
minority communities. And, lenders continue to justify those decisions by 
arguing that the results are unintentional and have a business justification. 
Congress and regulators must do more to ensure fair, affordable, sustainable 
mortgage finance. 
